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Preserving the Exceptional Republic: 
Political Economy, Race, and the 
Federalization of American Immigration 
Law 
Matthew J. Lindsay* 
In February 1885, United States Senator John Ingalls urged his 
colleagues during floor debate "to consider whether it may not be patriotic 
and prudent . . . to modify existing views as to the Declaration of 
Independence and the universal rights of man.") "[U]nless measures are 
taken to protect the American people, to protect this great civilization," he 
continued, "within a brief space dangers as great as those that have 
overthrown monarchs and despots may with ruthless rage assail the 
institutions of republican freedom."2 The menace of which Ingalls warned 
was not an imminent invasion by foreign armies, but rather the 
immigration to the United States of hordes of "foreign pauper laborers." 
Congressman Martin Foran sounded a similar theme several months 
earlier when he introduced the legislation championed by himself and 
Ingalls-the Contract Labor Act of 1885-to the House of 
Representatives. It was pure folly, Foran admonished, to believe "that our 
advanced and vigorous race [cannot be] deteriorated by coming in contact 
with other races or people."3 Unless Congress took swift action, he 
predicted, the United States would soon be left with "no energy, no 
American manhood, no moral convictions, no republic."4 Such dire 
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1. 16 CONGo REC. 1624 (1885). 
2. ld. 
3. 16 CONGo REC. 5351 (1884). 
4. Id. 
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exhortations must have struck a chord, for the Contract Labor Act passed 
both houses of Congress by an overwhelming majority. The Act 
prohibited the admission into the United States of European immigrants 
who set sail from their homelands after having entered into a labor 
contract with an American employer. 
Even as its sponsors insisted that the Act was essential to the 
preservation of American political values and institutions, both proponents 
and opponents of the legislation, within Congress and without, 
acknowledged that it contradicted two cardinal tenets of the nation's 
republican faith-first, the United States' historic liberality toward 
immigrants, rooted in Americans' confidence in the power of an open 
continent and free institutions to assimilate all comers; and second, the 
Gilded-Age understanding of the wage contract as the hallmark of 
economic freedom and personal independence. Yet Congress 
countenanced these apparent contradictions because, it concluded, a great 
number of European immigrants were irredeemably unfit-economically, 
politically, and, most significantly, racially-for inclusion within the 
American polity. This Article explains why patriotic republicans across 
the political spectrum joined in this "modification" of the nation's 
founding principles, and how a class of immigrants that less than a 
generation earlier had been widely celebrated as the lifeblood of the nation 
came to be viewed as a menace to American institutions. 
The Contract Labor Act was one of a spate of federal immigration laws 
enacted between 1882 and 1891, through which the federal government 
assumed virtually exclusive control over a regulatory sphere that 
historically had been the province of the states.s This Article argues that 
the new federal immigration regime was created through Congress' 
attempt to reconcile the nation's most cherished ideological 
commitment-the notion that the United States would forever remain an 
exceptional, "free labor" repUblic-with the unprecedented social and 
economic convulsions of the 1870s and 1880s. Since before the nation's 
founding, the core of the free labor ideal was the belief that a man's 
capacity for virtuous republican citizenship necessarily depended on his 
5. Foremost among the federal interventions were the Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 
214 (1882), transferring authority to oversee the landing of immigrants from individual states to the 
United States Treasury Department, see infra text accompanying notes 126-130; the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), prohibiting the entry of Chinese laborers into the 
United States for a period of ten years; the Contract Labor Act of 1885, chs. 161-64, 23 Stat. 332 
(1885), prohibiting any person or company "to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or 
encourage the importation or migration of ... any foreigner ... to perform labor or service of any kind 
in the United States," see infra text accompanying notes 143-161; and the Immigration Act of 1891, 
ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891), reaffirming key provisions of the 1882 and 1885 Acts, transferring the 
sole authority to administer immigration regulations to the federal government, and creating the office 
of the Superintendent of Immigration, under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, see infra 
text accompanying notes 234-241. 
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attainment of a kind of personal "freedom" that could only be secured 
through economic "independence." Originally, true independence, and 
thus political virtue, was firmly rooted in the ownership of both real 
property and the means of one's economic livelihood. Under this model, 
men who labored for wages were considered economically and personally 
dependent on their employers, and thus incapable of virtuous citizenship.6 
This "early republican" version of the free labor ideal suffered a series of 
shocks over the course of the century, as the industrial reorganization of 
labor made the traditional material prerequisites for independence 
unavailable to an increasingly large proportion of the adult male 
popUlation. As historians have demonstrated, Americans responded not by 
abandoning the free labor ideal, but by redefining the conditions of 
independence to suit the new industrial era. By the postbellum period, 
when the industrial revolution was in full swing and wage earning had 
become the norm rather than the exception, male industrial hirelings could 
claim the economic freedom and independence required for virtuous 
republican citizenship through the simple act of consenting to sell their 
labor for a wage.7 Here was a political economy for the era of wage labor, 
and the ideological crucible in which Americans forged a new federal 
immigration regime. 
As this Article demonstrates, the meaning of both immigrants and 
immigration was fundamentally transformed when two successive, though 
distinct, crises of mass economic dependency disturbed this reconstructed 
free labor worldview. The first was the wrenching depression that began 
in 1873 and lasted throughout the decade.s The United States experienced 
for the first time in its history the phenomenon of sustained 
unemployment, widespread public begging, and the chronic dependency 
of entire families. Americans confronted the spectacle of throngs of adult, 
able-bodied men whose subsistence outside of formal employment 
6. See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and Law in the Gilded Age, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 774. See also LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN 
WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER CULTURE 22-24 (1997); DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND 
EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REpUBLICANS, 1862-1872, at 30-33 (1981); DAVID R. 
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 
65-87 (1992); DANIEL ROGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 30-64 
(1974); AMy DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE 
MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 9-10 (1998); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION 
OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 
1350-1870, at 185-87 (1991). 
7. GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 17-34; ROGERS, supra note 6, passim; STANLEY, supra note 6, at 
I-59. 
8. The worldwide depression of the 1870s was the worst economic downturn of the nation's 
history. For public officials, charity administrators, and many other observers, the masses of 
unemployed adult, able-bodied, male heads-of-household begging in the streets for the support of their 
families signaled not only an economic crisis; it portended a profound and much more far-reaching 
threat to the nation's social and political order. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
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relations failed to satisfy even the stripped down, industrial-era conception 
of economic independence through wage labor. In the early 1880s, this 
first crisis of dependency was superceded by a second, as a chorus of 
observers charged that the starvation wages for which "American" 
workers were compelled to labor degraded them as men and as citizens. 
This second crisis of dependency struck at the heart of the free labor ideal 
even more forcefully than the first, implying that the wage contract itself 
might be an inadequate vehicle for independence and freedom. In both 
cases, however, the conspicuous social consequences of an industrial labor 
system premised on liberal economic relations seemed increasingly at 
odds with the republican values of manly independence and citizenly 
virtue. 
This Article argues that the federal regime of immigration regulation 
that took shape between 1882 and 1891 was created through 
contemporaries' efforts to reconcile these two "crises" with their cherished 
free labor worldview. The mostly Republican political intellectuals, 
policymakers, labor spokesmen, economists and others who were engaged 
publicly with the problem of mass economic dependency might have 
inquired into, and focused their efforts on redressing, the structural 
economic causes of the crises. Powerful critiques of the industrial labor 
system certainly were circulating at the time.9 Yet for free labor adherents, 
even to undertake such an inquiry would have been to admit the potential 
incompatibility of the wage contract-and the industrial labor system 
more generally-with independent, republican citizenship. Most Gilded-
Age Americans were not disposed to surrender quietly their bedrock 
economic and political faiths. Rather than compromise the ideological 
integrity of the free labor ideal, they embraced a powerful alternative 
diagnosis, characterizing as deficient those who did not act in the 
marketplace according to their theory of human economic nature. 1O In 
particular, contemporaries constructed the nation's successive crises of 
economic dependency as outbreaks of mass economic pathology, 
attributing widespread "pauperism," and later, "pauperizing labor," to the 
defective character of the poor themselves. That defectiveness, they 
9. Examples of such programs were readily available in the 1880s. The Knights of Labor, for 
example, drawing on traditions of "labor repUblicanism," adopted an organizational strategy that 
emphasized both enhancing labor unions' power in the market, and gaining political power through 
electoral politics. See Forbath, supra note 6, at 787-88,809. 
10. As this statement suggests, the attribution of mass dependency to individual and group 
deficiency operated ideologically as an alternative to diagnoses centering on the labor system itself. 
While this characterization is generally accurate, it is imponant to acknowledge that a number of 
actors, most notably labor spokesmen, advanced both critiques concurrently. Compare id., noting the 
Knights of Labor's advocacy of "structural" reforms of the labor system, with supra text 
accompanying note 177, describing Knights of Labor leader Terence Powderly's attack on degraded 
European immigrants as the source of labor market degradation. 
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further concluded, was not home-grown, but rather imported from the 
allegedly effete, racially degraded, declining civilizations of Europe. I I By 
drawing on a series of highly specialized, frequently shifting ideas about 
racial difference, policymakers and others went a long way toward 
mediating an otherwise intolerable conflict between American values and 
American realities. 12 The effect was to submerge a conspicuously 
unexceptional picture of industrial America into a discourse of economic 
pathology that associated foreignness with racial unfitness for free labor. 
This emergent construction of European immigrants demanded a basic 
redirection of regulatory policy and practice. Within less than two 
decades, policymakers, immigration officials, courts, political journalists, 
and labor activists reconceived the principal purpose of immigration 
regulation from assIstmg newly landed immigrants to excluding 
undesirables and, accordingly, shifted its operational emphasis from 
policing the environment into which immigrants entered to policing the 
immigrants themselves. Moreover, under the weight of these new 
regulatory priontles, the robust federalism that had traditionally 
characterized the nation's approach' to immigration gave way. 
Contemporaries' construction of mass dependency nationalized the 
purposes of immigration regulation, as a consensus emerged among 
influential northerners that the future of the American citizenry, the 
quality of citizenship itself, and, ultimately, the very health of the republic, 
were at stake. 
Gilded-Age Americans thus began to articulate a fundamentally novel 
understanding of the American polity. In this new era of industrial 
consolidation, urbanization, and wage labor, the political-economic 
II. The geographic origins of European immigration to the United States shifted dramatically 
between 1880 and the turn of the twentieth century. For the nation's first hundred years, the vast 
majority of Europeans arriving on American shores came from Great Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia, 
and Germany. Beginning in the 18805, however, the proportion of northern European immigrants 
steadily declined and, by 1896, their numbers were eclipsed by the arrival of so-called "new 
immigrants" from Italy, Greece, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and Russia. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, 
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1994); GWENDOLYN 
MINK, OLD LABOR AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: UNION, PARTY, 
AND STATE, 1875-1920 (1986). For a helpful overview of the economic and political structure of 
European immigration during this period, see JOHN BODNAR, THE TRANSPLANTED: A HISTORY OF 
IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA I-56 (1985). 
12. It bears mentioning that the racial construction of European immigrants was just one prong of 
a much broader political and ideological impulse to constrict eligibility for citizenship. As a leading 
economist and amateur race scientist observed in 1896, 
Each class or section of the nation is becoming conscious of an opposition between its standards 
and the activities and tendencies of some less developed class. The South has its negro, the city 
has its slums .... The friends of American institutions fear the ignorant immigrant, and the 
workingman dislikes the Chinese. Every one is beginning to differentiate those with the proper 
qualifications for citizenship from some other class or classes which he wishes to restrain or 
exclude from society. 
Simon Patten, The Theory of Social Forces, 7 ANNALS AM. ASS'N SOc. POL. SCI. 143 (Supp. 1896), 
quoted in ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 133 (1998). 
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paradigm of self-sustaining households headed by independent male 
"producers"-the essential units of both traditional and "reconstructed" 
free labor ideology-appeared to be fading into history. In its place, 
contemporaries saw a vast reservoir of human material, consisting of the 
impoverished wage laborers and the unemployed who increasingly 
amassed in the nation's northern cities. They envisioned an American 
social and political body whose health depended, above all, not on the 
assimilative and uplifting influence of republican economic and political 
institutions, but rather on the collective natural endowments of its 
constituent members. The basic terms of the old free labor discourse-
independence, virtuous citizenship, and the like-were not, strictly 
speaking, displaced by this new image, but infused with transformative 
new meanings. 
Existing scholarship does not convincingly account for the timing, 
content, or legal consequences of the racial construction of European 
immigrants. 13 Critical race scholars who have taken up the issue generally 
have applied an analytical framework that is poorly suited for this 
subject. 14 The racial line of interest for such scholars typically is the line 
that has been drawn to distinguish "whites" from members of other, 
disfavored races. 15 Perhaps accustomed to thinking about the legal history 
of race in the United States as a protracted dispute over the meaning and 
13. Some have skirted the issue of race altogether. See, e.g., KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR: 1820-1924, at 41-71 (1984) (omitting mention of 
race in its analysis of Congress' efforts to control the supply of labor through immigration regulation); 
ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GoWEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND 
IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 12-19 (confining its discussion of racialist nativism to that directed at 
Chinese immigration); E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY, 1798-1965, at 77-121 (1981) (quoting the explicitly racialist arguments advanced by 
restrictionists without addressing the issue); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FuNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (omitting discussion of race in its account 
of the Gilded-Age federalization of immigration regulation); Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: 
Immigrant Padrones and Contract Laborers in Nonh America, 1885-1925,83 J. AM. HIST. 848-71 
(1996) (omitting discussion of race). 
14. For an insightful review and critique of critical race scholarship, see Daniel J. Sharfstein, The 
Secret History of Race in the United States, 112 YALE LJ. 1473, 1478-84 (2003). 
15. I do not wish to suggest that this choice of scholarly focus is inappropriate; indeed, it is well 
warranted by history. The policing of the color line-by communities, legislatures, and courts-
historically has carried enormous stakes for the individuals whose claimed racial identities, and thus 
social, political, and legal status, have been the subject of legal dispute. In the context of slavery and 
Jim Crow, for example, for many thousands of people the precise location of the color line meant the 
difference between slavery and freedom, or, after emancipation, between equal citizenship and the 
near-total civil and political disentitlement. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Propeny, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1790 (1993). On whiteness trials in the slave and Jim Crow south, see Ariela J. Gross, Litigating 
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE LJ. 109 
(1998); Sharfstein, supra note 14. In the context of immigration, Congress' restriction of eligibility for 
naturalization, in the Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, I Stat. 103, to "free white persons" similarly 
insured that the highest stakes, and hence the greatest legal contestation would attach to the 
adjudication of asserted claims to whiteness. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE By LAW: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 43-109 (1996); Annie M. Chan, Community and the Constitution: A 
Reassessment o/the Roots of Immigration Law, 21 VT. L. REv. 491, 515-26 (1996). 
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boundary of "whiteness," they have viewed the racial discourses deployed 
by restrictionists against Europeans through the lens of a fundamentally 
dichotomous racial landscape. As a result, these scholars tend to read late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century assertions of a given group's racial 
inferiority to mean that the members of that group were not considered 
"white."16 This interpretation is highly misleading. However inferior the 
"racial" natures of Italians, Hungarians, Slavs, Hebrews, and others may 
have appeared when measured against an Anglo-Saxon ideal, the despised 
races of southern and eastern Europe nevertheless were, by most observers 
and in most contexts, regarded as "white."!7 Second, and more 
importantly, the near-exclusive focus on the construction and maintenance 
of the color line has caused scholars to neglect racial discourses that did 
not result directly in the political and legal disentitlement of the groups at 
which they were directed. This Article contends that although the 
racialization of European immigrants would not, until much later, 18 
culminate in the kind of group-categorical race legislation that was 
enacted against African Americans and Chinese immigrants, its 
consequences were nevertheless far-reaching with respect to the history of 
"race" in the United States. Acknowledging that European laborers could 
16. One prominent example illustrates this tendency. In his seminal 1994 Article, "The Social 
Construction of Race," Ian Haney L6pez addresses the racial construction of European immigrants 
through an historical lens adapted to tracking and deconstructing the ever-migrating color line between 
blacks, Asians, and Latin Americans, on the one hand, and whites, on the other. This framework leads 
Haney L6pez to read the assertions of tum-of-the-century restrictionists and courts that Europeans did 
not comprise a single, monolithic white race to mean that members of at least some European races-
the inferior ones--could not have been considered "white" at all. Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social 
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. c.R.-c.L. 
L. REV. I, 34 (1994). See also Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic 
Relations: A 'Magic Mirror' into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1129 (1998) (noting that 
"southern and eastern European immigrants, commonly thought of today as white ethnics, were 
'racialized' as non-White"); Ian F. Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to 
LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1192 (1997) (referring to the historical racialization of today's 
"white ethnics" as "non-white"). 
17. Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century policymakers, social reformers, social scientists, 
and others typically comprehended immigrants' attributes that they found objectionable-for example, 
their alleged slothfulness, sexual immorality, poor domestic habits, pathological economic behavior, 
and political radicalism-as hereditary, group-categorical, and sometimes ineradicable. Although 
Europeans frequently were characterized as members of distinct regional or national "races" in a way 
that the modem term "ethnicity" does not capture, they were not generally defined as "non-white." 
When contemporary scholars have been confronted with late-nineteenth-century references to Slav, 
Mediterranean, !beric, Latin, Celtic, and Teuton "races," explains historian Matthew Jacobson, they 
have often wrongly dismissed such usage as a relic of a bygone era's misunderstanding of "race." 
MAITHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
ALCHEMY OF RACE 5-6 (1998). As Jacobson writes, an "accurate historical rendering of race in the 
structure of U.S. culture and the experience of those immigrants now called 'Caucasian,'" requires that 
contemporary scholars "admit a system of 'difference' by which one might be both white and racially 
distinct from other whites." /d. at 6. 
18. Although it provided for national quotas rather than outright "racial" exclusion, the 
Immigration Act of 1924 is properly understood as race legislation. See Mae M. Ngai, The 
Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 
86 J. AM. HIST. 67 (1999). 
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be adjudged unfit for inclusion within the American polity even as their 
"whiteness" remained culturally intact enables us to better recognize the 
subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which their racial construction 
underwrote the Gilded-Age federalization of immigration regulation. 
Further, by focusing on the production of racial difference within the 
category of whiteness, we see how the racialist nativism of the 1880s and 
1890s helped to inaugurate in the United States a mode of political 
discourse in which the social and economic causes of poverty are effaced 
in favor of diagnoses centering on the alleged pathologies of distinct, often 
racially defined, groupS.19 In important respects, the surge of nativism in 
the final decades of the nineteenth century parallels the North's retreat 
from southern Reconstruction and its relative lack of resistance to the rise 
of the Jim Crow system. In each case, racial difference gained sway as an 
argument for denying to the disfavored class full access to the American 
economic and political order. 
Several scholars of American immigration law have taken the racial 
construction of European immigrants on its own terms. Two of the most 
sophisticated, Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith, insightfully analyze the 
apparent tension between the restrictionist discourse of racialist nativism, 
and the liberal republican worldview that informed the nation's 
longstanding liberality toward European immigration.20 Both argue, in 
19. Since the late-nineteenth century, the seeming intractability of severe, politically 
disempowering economic inequality has stood as an unsettling contradiction for a nation committed to 
equal citizenship. By analyzing how influential Gilded-Age observers responded to the North's first 
encounter with mass economic dependency, this Article helps to illuminate how the United States has 
managed to live with that contradiction. For scholarship on contemporary parallels, see, for example, 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 160-181 (1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: 
THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 51-86,155-82 (1996). 
20. Schuck explains that the Gilded-Age ideological shift "from traditional liberalism to 
restrictive nationalism, ... reflected the influence of external pressures more than the internal logic of 
principle." PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP 24 (1998). Foremost among those "external pressures" was the dramatic 
transformation of the "ethnic, cultural, and class composition of the immigrant population ... between 
the l870s and World War I." Id. at 23. This transformation, Schuck maintains, "triggered the 
explosive passions of racial and religious prejudice, fears of revolutionary contagion, class conflict, 
and other deep-seated animosities against the newcomers .... Powerful pressures to limit both the 
level of immigration and the rights of aliens consequently developed." ld. at 5-6. As a result, 
"nationalistic, exclusionary values were superimposed upon the earlier individualistic ideology of 
traditional liberalism." Id. at 21. Smith similarly characterizes Gilded-Age "ascriptivism"-his term 
for inegalitarian discourses that "assign[] people in hereditary hierarchical orders"-as a "repudiation 
of Reconstruction egalitarianism and inclusiveness." ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING 
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 3, 347 (1997). 
Schuck's metaphor-figuring racial prejudice as a kind of powder keg-rests on an overly 
simplistic conception of race and racism, and does little to explain either the timing or the content of 
the racialist nativism directed against the new immigrants. As this Article shows, the racial 
construction of European immigrants-not simply the fact that they were made the objects of racialist 
discourse, but the specific racial traits variably ascribed to them by their detractors-reflects not an 
"explosion" "triggered" by the self-evident ethnic or cultural "differences" of the new arrivals, but 
rather a direct reaction to the mounting ideological tension between liberal republicanism and the 
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slightly different terms, that the ascription of racial unfitness to European 
immigrants gained political traction in the United States because it 
enabled political elites to cultivate a sense of national identity, or common 
"peoplehood," among citizens who were otherwise bound together only by 
liberal principles of consent.21 This interpretation, however, explains 
neither the sudden explosion of racialist arguments for restriction, nor the 
considerable variability of those arguments over a relatively short period 
of time. Why did European immigrants become the objects of such 
unfavorable racial construction when they did? Further, why did the 
cluster of specific racial attributes ascribed to Italians, Hungarians, Poles, 
and others shift so dramatically between the depression of 1873 and the 
passage of the Contract Labor Act in 1885? This Article argues that 
racialist nativism enabled contemporaries to reconcile their republican 
worldview with an economic landscape that increasingly called the 
sustainability of that ideological commitment into question. If racially 
inherited economic pathology was responsible for the dual crises of mass 
economic dependency, neither the industrial wage system nor the liberal 
economic theory on which that system was premised had to be re-
examined. Mass dependency could be eradicated, and virtuous, 
independent citizenship restored, simply by raising new barriers of access 
to the American labor market. Free labor republicanism thus retained its 
moral and ideological viability by expunging from the market in wage 
labor, and thus from the liberal universe, those whose racial natures unfit 
them for free labor. By injecting a supplemented logic of racial 
spectacle of mass economic dependency. 
Other scholars similarly acknowledge the importance of racialist nativism to the federalization 
story, but omit any sustained investigation into the historical process through which the racial meaning 
ascribed to immigrants took shape. The Gilded-Age surge of racialist discourse is often represented as 
a straightforward, if exaggerated and irrational, response to the actual differences-in culture, 
language, or complexion-born by the "new" European immigrants. See KEITH FITZGERALD, THE 
FACE OF THE NATION: IMMIGRATION, THE STATE, AND THE NATIONAL IDENTITY 108 (1996) 
(explaining that as immigrants' "skin darkened, as the languages they spoke became less familiar," 
officials lost faith in assimilation); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE 
REpUBLIC: CLASS POLITICS AND MASS CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 311 (1990) 
(asserting that when "the main sources of immigration had shifted from Western Europe to Southern 
and Eastern Europe, ' . . [it] became possible to argue that the more recent immigrants--darker 
skinned and culturally more remote from Anglo-Irish-American norms-were, like the Asians, 
racially unassimilable"). 
21. As Schuck puts it, "the individual wills that liberalism glorifies must be merged into an 
almost mystical embodiment of national character and patriotic purpose." SCHUCK, supra note 20, at 
78-79. In order for "liberal values to triumph, ... liberalism [was] obliged to accommodate a 
competing, illiberal conception of community that threatens those values even as it promises to 
actualize them-albeit for only a limited portion of humanity." [d. at 79. Smith explains that Gilded-
Age "leaders in both parties found that they could best gain support by responding to the fears and 
hopes of [the] era .... They promised to guard Americans against the new dangers from within and 
without via policies of restriction, exclusion, and mandatory assimilation .... " SMITH, supra note 20, 
at 348. See also DESMOND KING, MAKING AMERICANS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND THE ORIGINS OF 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 38-39 (2000) (endorsing Smith's analysis). 
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contingency into their putatively universalist political economy, critics of 
liberal immigration thus ratified their worldview by narrowing its scope of 
application.22 
Part I of this Article argues that in the immediate postbellum period, the 
regulation of immigration into New York-the nation's primary port of 
entry-was animated by state officials' thoroughgoing confidence that 
European immigration represented an invaluable economic asset to the 
nation; that the overwhelming majority of immigrants were highly 
desirable as new additions to the American laboring population; and that 
by taking aggressive measures to protect newly landed immigrants against 
fraud and debilitating illness, New York best served the confluent interests 
of the state, the nation, and the immigrants themselves. Part II analyzes 
responses to the emergence of mass dependency in the nation's northern 
cities, between 1873 and the early 1880s. It argues that, even in the face of 
a crippling nationwide depression, contemporaries tended to attribute the 
economic crisis to a recent influx of "foreign paupers." Although critics of 
liberal immigration generally stopped short of rendering the kinds of 
racially categorical diagnoses that would become routine in the late 1880s 
and 1890s, the discourse of foreign pauperism nevertheless began to 
transform the stated purpose of immigration regulation, and to build the 
case for federal control. Finally, Part III analyzes the claim, ubiquitous 
between the mid-1880s and the 1890s, that hordes of European "pauper 
laborers" were invading the American labor market. In contrast to the idle 
dependents of the previous decade, critics charged, foreign pauper laborers 
not only labored willfully for a wage, but did so with a vengeance that 
threatened to make a mockery of the ideal of free labor, and to destroy the 
22. My analysis of the mutually constitutive relationship between the universalist premises of 
liberal republican political economy, on the one hand, and the rise of racialist nativism, on the other, 
has been greatly influenced by Thomas Holt's masterful study of post-emancipation Jamaica. See 
THOMAS C. HOLT, THE PROBLEM OFF'REEDOM: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN JAMAICA, 1832-1938 
(1992). Holt contends that for British policy elites, the emancipation of several hundred thousand 
black colonials was "a moment of truth in which the internal contradictions of classical liberalism 
stood exposed." [d. at xix. Holt explains: 
[FJormer slaves ... who failed to respond to the market as they were supposed to were relegated 
to the status of wards of a superior civilization. Moreover, the fact that historically some of these 
same attitudes were also adopted toward white laborers who failed liberalism's test suggests that 
"racism" was embedded in the very premises of a presumptively nonracist liberalism; that the 
virulently racist ideology of the late nineteenth century was not merely some aberrant 
anachronism, or throwback to slavery, but in large part a creature of the ostensibly non racist 
ideology that had undermined and destroyed slavery. 
[d. at xx. Ultimately, Holt concludes, 
the defense of the 'natural' social order depended on how one understood ... human nature. 
Critical to sustaining social structures founded on blatant inequalities, within the terms of 
[liberal democratic] ideology, was the notion that some people-because of their fundamental 
racial natures-should be restrained, should not be free. 
!d. at xxiii. In this way, "racialist ideologies came to be essential to sustaining the overarching 
ideology of freedom." [d. 
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independence and virtue of "native" American workers. Through the 
discourse of pauper labor, I argue, contemporaries crystallized the 
construction of dependency as a consequence of group, and often racial, 
pathology, and then formalized that construction through the enactment of 
national exclusionary legislation. Although the Commerce Clause served 
as Congress' formal constitutional warrant for drawing immigration 
within the federal regulatory domain, Part III concludes that the 
underlying purpose of the new legislation was much closer to that of 
traditional state police regulations. Viewed in this light, the new federal 
regime looks less like a regulation of foreign commerce than an 
expression of an inchoate federal police power. 
I. FREE LABOR AND FREE IMMIGRATION IN THE EXCEPTIONAL REpUBLIC 
This Part analyzes the prevailing American view of European 
immigration before the Gilded-Age crises of mass dependency. It 
demonstrates how free labor republicanism shaped mid-nineteenth-century 
contemporaries' assessment and governance of European immigrants. 
Confident that free labor and repUblican institutions would transform the 
overwhelming majority of immigrants into virtuous, independent citizens, 
they cheered the new arrivals as a boon to the nation, and frequently even 
celebrated the commingling of foreign and native "blood." Immigration 
administrators, sanguine about immigrants' prospects for successful 
assimilation, understood their role to be primarily that of assisting and 
protecting the recent arrivals in order to preserve their independence-a 
regulatory outlook that they believed strongly counseled state, as opposed 
to federal, control. But before proceeding, it is important to explain briefly 
the rapidly changing ideological backdrop against which mid-century 
observers evaluated immigrants and immigration. 
Although personal independence had been a deeply held economic and 
political ideal since before the nation's founding, its meaning evolved over 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century, as industrialization 
converted self-employed farmers and skilled craftsmen into wage earners, 
as workers and their families moved from self-owned farms into cities, 
and as the debate over slavery loomed increasingly large in the national 
consciousness. The emergence in the United States of a class of workers 
who would spend their entire lives laboring for a wage conflicted sharply 
with the nation's traditional model of male citizenship-a model that 
located the vaunted ideal of independence and the capacity for 
disinterested civic virtue and political participation in the ownership of 
real property.23 In western law, economics, and philosophy, the freedom to 
23. DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862-
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enter into commercial contracts had for centuries been associated with the 
sovereignty of the individual will and the formal equality of freely 
consenting, self-possessed individuals.24 The wage contract, however, was 
widely viewed as exactly the opposite-a relation of emasculating 
dependency. In Enlightenment philosophy, to labor at the behest of 
another constituted a forfeiture of economic independence; in common 
law, the wage contract was classified as a domestic relation. Indeed, for 
the first half of the nineteenth century hireling labor was widely believed 
to signify dependency and subordination. Hirelings not only surrendered 
the economic independence associated with property ownership and self-
employment; they subjected their personal autonomy and political will to 
the authority of their employer.25 
In the postbellum era, for the first time in the nation's history a majority 
of male workers labored for a wage.26 Whether the status of such men was 
compatible with equal democratic citizenship became the paramount 
political and ideological problem of the decades following the Civil War. 
Although northerners superficially agreed on the superiority of free labor, 
that shared discourse disguised what was, in reality, a radical divergence 
of views concerning the essential conditions of freedom.27 Did the kind of 
self-sufficiency that could be had only from property ownership remain an 
indispensable component of true freedom, as republican theory had long 
held? Or, in the era of wage labor, did mere self-ownership, expressed 
through the sale of one's labor, suffice? Although some working men 
continued to contest the easy equation of personal freedom with liberty of 
contract,28 by 1870 that view was ascendant among congressional 
Republicans and political intellectuals. In the North and South alike, a 
man's capacity to enter into a wage contract, to alienate his labor for a 
price, became the principle hallmark of masculine freedom and 
1872, at 25-44 (1981); GoRDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 178 
(1991); Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37 
(1987). On the transfonnation of labor generally in the nineteenth century, see ALAN DAWLEY, CLASS 
AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN 11-96 (1976); BRUCE LAURIE, ARTISANS 
TO WORKERS: LABOR IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 14-46 (1989); SEAN WILENZ, CHANTS 
DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850, at 
107-42 (1984). 
24. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO 
LOCKE 263-71 (1962). 
25. Forbath, supra note 6, at 774; GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 22-24; MONTGOMERY, supra note 
23, at 30-33; DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 65-87 (1992); ROGERS, supra note 6, at 30-64; STANLEY, supra note 6, at 
9-10; STEINFELD, supra note 6, at 185-87. 
26. MONTGOMERY, supra note 23, at 9-30. 
27. See generally NANCY COHEN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865-
1914, at 29 (2002); GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 99-107; STANLEY, supra note 6, at 60-97. 
28. See ROGERS, supra note 6, at 153-81; STANLEY, supra note 6, at 60-97. 
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independence, rather than a badge of feminized dependency. 29 
The conflict over slavery, as much as any other factor, transformed the 
cultural and ideological meaning of the wage contract.3D Abolitionists 
extolled the voluntary exchange of one's labor for a wage as the antithesis 
of slavery. The compulsion inherent in the slave system, they argued, 
violated the fundamental tenets of both economic morality and human 
nature, denying the right of man to govern himself, to enjoy bodily 
integrity, to own property, and to dispose of his labor at market price.31 
Consent became the language of individual freedom, and thus acquired the 
moral and emotional weight of opposing human bondage.32 Slave 
emancipation and the victory of the Union Army further elevated the wage 
contract as the essence of freedom, individual economic agency, and male 
independence. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 enshrined this thinking in 
law, explicitly securing the right to contract for the sale of one's labor as 
an essential right of citizenship.33 This reconstruction of independence 
established the ideological terrain on which Gilded-Age Americans would 
confront the nation's crises of dependency, and the lens through which 
they viewed immigration.34 
Before 1870, the prevailing posture toward European immigration to the 
29. GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 17-34; STANLEY, supra note 6, at I-59. Over the last third of the 
nineteenth century, Lawrence Glickman explains, "[t]he sale of the self for living wages became a 
paradigm of self-ownership and a symbol of modem masculinity." GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 37. 
30. Forbath, supra note 6, at 785-86; STANLEY, supra note 6, at 21. On the antithetical 
relationship between slavery and liberal capitalism in abolitionist thought, see DAVID BRION DAVIS, 
THE MEANING OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823 (1975). 
31. RONALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ApPEAL: AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM AFTER 1830 
(1978). 
32. STANLEY, supra note 6, at I-59. 
33. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 244 
(1988). As one congressman noted in the congressional debate over the bill, its purpose was to "secure 
to a poor, weak class of laborers the right to make contracts for their labor, the power to enforce the 
payment of their wages, and the means of holding and enjoying the proceeds of their toil." Id. at 244. 
On the meaning of wage labor in the Reconstruction South, see JULIE SAVILLE, THE WORK OF 
RECONSTRUCTION: FROM SLAVE TO WAGE LABORER IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1860-1870 (1994); 
STANLEY, supra note 6. This view of the wage contract by no means went uncontested, as northern 
labor spokesmen vigorously dissented throughout the 1870s and 1880s. See GLICKMAN, supra note 6, 
at 17-25; MONTGOMERY, supra note 23; STANLEY, supra note 6, at 60-97. 
34. Like contract freedom, "domesticity supplied a language for sectional conflict" (STANLEY, 
supra note 6, at 24), as the relative integrity of the northern household served as a basis on which to 
celebrate free labor and condemn slavery. For the Republican authors of Reconstruction, the rights of 
the freeman rested "on a conception of the family as an indivisible unit premised on male authority 
and female dependence." STANLEY, supra note 6, at 58. In the North, too, a deeply gendered ideology 
of domesticity became an essential component of working-class independence. A sharp conceptual 
distinction between the market-the masculine sphere of competitive economic exchange and 
productive labor-and the domestic-the feminine sphere of familial affection and selfless moral 
virtue-"disrupt[ed] the analogy between wives and hired men" by positing a spatial and natural 
distinction between "women's dependent household labor [and] men's independent wage labor." Amy 
Dru Stanley, Home Life and the Morality of the Market, in THE MARKET REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: 
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS EXPRESSIONS, 1800-1880, at 85 (Melvyn Stokes & Stephen 
Conwayeds., 1996). 
194 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 17:181 
United States was one of enthusiastic celebration. In a nation that 
associated economic progress with the expansion of the skilled trades and 
the cultivation of undeveloped western lands, immigration supplied the 
indispensable raw material for an advancing civilization. As Carl Schurz, 
a rising star of the young Republican Party, explained to an audience in 
1859, the "American nationality" necessarily "incorporates the vigorous 
elements of all civilized nations on earth." While acknowledging that the 
"Anglo-Saxon spirit" had been the nation's traditional "locomotive of 
progress," Schurz urged his audience to remember that 
this locomotive would be of little use to the world if it refused to 
draw its train over the iron highway and carry its valuable freight 
towards its destination; that train consists of the vigorous elements of 
all nations; that freight is the vital ideas of our age; that destination is 
universal freedom and the ideal development of man.35 
Of course, such optimism did not go unchallenged. The 1850s were 
marked by an upsurge of anti-immigrant nativism directed mostly against 
the Irish, who had been arriving in unprecedented numbers since 1845. 
The Know Nothing Party enjoyed brief but widespread electoral success 
in the mid-1850s by denouncing immigrants (particularly Catholics), and 
advocating a host of Draconian restrictions on immigrant suffrage, 
including lengthy naturalization periods and even post-naturalization 
limits on the franchise.36 Notwithstanding the currency of such sentiment, 
its influence was channeled primarily into proposals to protect the 
integrity of the vote, rather than efforts to limit immigration per se. The 
great weight of public and official opinion instead strongly favored liberal 
European immigrationY For decades American business leaders had 
energetically promoted· the virtues of free immigration. Industrial 
employers, such as railroads and manufacturers, dispatched agents to 
Europe and French Canada in order to recruit foreign laborers, while the 
United States Treasury Department and captains of American industry 
energetically calculated the economic value of free immigration to the 
national wealth.38 
35. Carl Schurz, "True Americanism," speech delivered in Faneuil Hall, Boston, April 18, 1859, 
in IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION 121, 123-24 (Moses Rischin, ed., 1976). On the 
postbellum enthusiasm for immigrant labor, see HIGHAM, supra note II, at 14-19. 
36. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 82-86 (2000). 
37. See generally DANIELS, supra note 13, at 6-7; William E. Forbath, "Who, the People?: Race, 
Class, and National Identity in the Law and Politics of European Immigration" (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author). 
38. HIGHAM, supra note II, at 17. Andrew Carnegie, for example, estimated the average 
monetary value of each immigrant at $1,500. [d. The federal government, too, actively encouraged 
immigration, particularly during the Civil War. Historian Kitty Calavita explains that in 1862, 
Secretary of State William Seward "saturated U.S. officials in Europe with pamphlets for distribution 
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The New York Commissioners of Emigration (the Commissioners)-
the state agency that annually administered the admission of three-quarters 
of the nation's immigrants-agreed that immigration was both an 
invaluable economic resource and the embodiment of free, independent 
labor. Commissioner Friedrich Kapp, one of the nation's leading 
authorities on immigration, spoke for most of his contemporaries in 1870 
when he explained that the United States "owe[d] its wonderful 
development mainly to the conflux of the poor and outcast of Europe 
within it"-to "the sturdy farmer and industrious mechanic" who through 
their "toils and sufferings . . . built up . . . the proud structure of this 
Republic, which in itself is the glorification . . . of free and intelligent 
labor."39 In contrast to the indentured servants of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, who endured a form of dependence on their 
employers akin to bondage, the modem, independent immigrant relied "on 
his own strength, acts on his own responsibility, and seeks [prosperity] by 
his own efforts."40 The hearty independence and self-possessed economic 
agency of such immigrants were thus tributes to the values of free labor. 
In characterizing the immigrant laborer as "his own master," 
immigration enthusiasts frequently contrasted him with the slave-the 
quintessential nineteenth-century symbol of bondage and dependency. It 
was "from no whim of the immigrant," wrote Kapp, "that he avoided the 
Southern States while they were cursed with slavery; for a land can have 
no civil liberty in which freedom of labor and the dignity wherewith 
respectable employment is invested do not exist.,,41 Reporting to the New 
York State Legislature on the unwillingness of recent immigrants to move 
to the former Confederacy, the Commissioners noted that the problem was 
especially acute in "the extreme Southern districts where there are only 
great planters, whose mode of cultivation has no attractions for the 
immigrants. [The immigrant's} individuality is overlooked, his self-respect 
advertising high wages in the U.S. and publicizing the advantages of the Homestead Act." CALAVITA, 
supra note 13, at 36. President Lincoln opened the 1864 congressional session by entreating Congress 
to establish 
a system for the encouragement of immigration. Although this source of natural wealth and 
strength is again flowing with greater freedom than for several years before the insurrection 
occurred, there is still a deficiency of laborers in every field of industry .... While the demand 
for labor is thus increased here, tens of thousands of persons, destitute of remunerative 
occupation, are thronging our foreign consulates, and offering to emigrate to the U.S., if 
essential, but very cheap, assistance can be afforded them. 
CONGo GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendices I & 2, quoted in HUTCHINSON, supra note 13, at 48. 
In 1864, Congress passed the Act to Encourage Immigration, establishing the Federal Bureau of 
Immigration for the purpose of developing a surplus labor force. Though the Act was repealed in 
1868, during its short life the Bureau fostered the creation of a variety of private labor recruitment 
agencies that continued to encourage immigration. CALAVITA, supra note 13, at 41. 
39. Friedrich Kapp, Immigration, 2 J. SOC. SCI. 1,2 (1870). 
40. /d. at 9, 4. 
41. /d. at 10. 
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impaired, and he is viewed as a mere unit in the mass." He was thus 
repelled by the prospect of joining the southern "stock of free slaves. "42 
Commentators' celebration of the value and independence of immigrant 
labor was closely intertwined with their confidence in the nation's powers 
of cultural and political assimilation. Notwithstanding "the various 
manners, habits, and opinions of so many nationalities, some of them, if 
not repugnant, ... at least strange to the native-born America," one writer 
marveled, "[t]he power of absorption possessed by the people of the 
United States is astonishing."43 "There is among those adopting our land 
as a home a tendency to assimilate," observed another. Through 
fraternization with "native" Americans and exposure to public 
education-a powerful "policy of insurance from our republican and 
protestant institutions"-immigrants are "liberalized, Americanized, and . 
. . [thus] grow up with the state, of the state, and for the state."44 
In stark contrast to the racialist nativism of later decades, mid-century 
theorists frequently extolled the nation's capacity to extract from 
immigrants their objectionable national and "racial" traits. "Columbia, 
taking to her ample bosom the fiery Celt and the phlegmatic Teuton, the 
self-asserting Briton and the debonnaire Gaul ... waits patiently for time 
and example to cure them,"45 one writer affirmed. Even the inter-
generational transmission of distinctly foreign phrenological traits was 
thought to be disrupted by the United States' potent powers of 
assimilation. "The heavy features of the northern European are more or 
less elongated and brightened into thoughtful cheerfulness in his American 
child," this writer continued, "while the angularity and pugnacity 
supposed to be characteristic of the Celtic countenance are reduced to 
finer lines of grace and repose in their ... descendants."46 Not only were 
immigrants' racially distinctive traits muted through assimilation; 
Americans' confidence in assimilation placed in doubt the very 
naturalness of those traits. 
Some commentators even celebrated the incorporation of foreign traits 
as a positive benefit to the American citizenry. It was from the "widely 
compounded" material supplied by European immigration, the popular 
DeBow's Review editorialized in 1855, that the virtues of the United States 
grew. "And as the blood of every nation that treads upon the earth is 
throbbing in American veins, so it is no exaggeration to say that the 
42. ANNUAL REpORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FOR 
THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1869, at 108, 109 (1870). 
43. The Philosophy of Immigration, 9 CATH. WORLD 399, 402 (1869). 
44. Immigration; Its Evils and Their Remedies, 13 NEW ENGLANDER 262, 264, 274 (1855) 
[hereinafter Immigration; Its Evils]. 
45. The Philosophy of Immigration, supra note 43, at 402. 
46. Id. at 404 (emphasis added). 
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energy and enterprise of all the world bid fair to concentrate upon 
American shores.,,47 In contrast to the "Anglo-Saxonism" that would 
predominate in the 1890s,48 the article characterized racial "purity" as a 
distinct detriment to the human constitution. "[A] survey of the facts will 
show," it instructed, "that the purer the blood becomes, the nearer it 
approximates water, and that persons who can look up to the loftiest and 
remotest parentage, are usually gifted with the flightiest minds."49 If this 
"physiologic principle" is correct, the editorial concluded, "it follows that 
America pre-eminently owes its growth and prosperity to the 
amalgamation of foreign blood. To cut [it] off, therefore, or to discourage 
its influx, will be to check the current from which our very life is 
drawn.,,50 
Commentators expressed similar confidence in European immigrants' 
political assimilation. To the extent that newcomers presented a potential 
political risk at all, it was not due to any inherent unfitness for republican 
government-as many would come to believe in the mid-1880s and 
1890s-but rather because they might aggregate into unassimilated blocs, 
forming political commitments and sub-loyalties removed from the 
interests of the polity as a whole. As one author reassured his readers, 
immigrants are "naturally absorbed in the existing political parties."51 To 
adopt the calls of the Know Nothing Party to extend the period of 
naturalization from five to twenty-one years would constitute "an affront 
to manhood .... [S]uch proscription to a position of minority, inferiority, 
and presumed ignorance and hostility, would naturally work anything but 
an amicable and cooperative feeling toward their adopted government."52 
In other words, political danger lurked not with foreigners themselves, but 
in the imposition on immigrants of a common civil disability that might 
cause them to experience their condition as that of a subordinate class. A 
47. Sources from Which Great Empires Come, 18 DEBow's REv. 698, 700-01 (1855) 
[hereinafter Great Empires]. The United States, the article argued, should follow the example of the 
great empires of the past. Greece sprang from a "horde of barbarous tribes"; the "introduction of ... 
foreign elements was like the descent of rain upon the barren earth." Rome was the product of a 
"parentage even more promiscuous and insignificant," where "in one mighty mass mingled conqueror 
and captive, noble and base, freeman and slave. Out of such materials, like some stately tree that roots 
best in filthy soil, in three centuries grew the republic of Rome." Id. at 699. 
48. See HIGHAM, supra note II, at 68-105. 
49. Great Empires, supra note 47, at 702. See also Immigration; Its Evils, supra note 44, at 274 
(arguing that colonial Americans were descended from high-quality material, rather than "aristocratic 
off-shoots" suffering from a "deterioration of the stock" as a result of "high cultivation"). 
50. Great Empires, supra note 47, at 704. Condemning the anti-immigrant sentiment of the mid-
1850s, DeBow's Review chided, "[ w ]hat, though the population which is annually cast upon American 
shores is all of the filthiest and most degraded kind! The farmer might as well complain of the black 
and reeking soil into which his seed is dropped, as the statesman of such materials as these." Id. at 
704. 
51. Immigration; Its Evils, supra note 44, at 264, 273. 
52. Id. at 273. 
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broad cross-section of Americans thus celebrated immigrants not only for 
their labor, but also as a positive addition to the quality of the population. 
Throughout the postbellum period, this confidence-in immigrants' 
economic value; in the freedom and independence ascribed to their labor; 
in their cultural, racial and political assimilability; and in their 
contribution to the progress of the republic-led policymakers, 
administrators, and others to view control over immigration as a 
straightforward police function that fit comfortably within the province of 
state competence and authority. 
The Commissioners' view that "the value of emigration from Europe 
cannot be estimated too highly," and accordingly, that the 
"encouragement of emigration by every possible means ... [was] a matter 
of the highest political necessity for the prosperity of the country,"53 
directly shaped their regulatory priorities. Well into the 1870s, the 
Commissioners understood their primary mission to be that of providing a 
refuge and hospital for immigrants who arrived in New York destitute or 
sick, and protecting immigrants from being looted by thieves or defrauded 
by deceitful boardinghouse keepers, inland transportation companies, 
freight and luggage handlers, and employers.54 "The problem to be 
solved," wrote Commissioner Kapp in 1870, "was to protect the 
newcomer, to prevent him from being robbed, to facilitate his passage 
through the city to the interior, to aid him with good advice, and, in cases 
of most urgent necessity, to furnish him with a small amount of money."55 
Lest this relation of paternalistic care and protection be understood as a 
form of dependency on the part of newly landed immigrants, the 
Commissioners emphasized that their goal was in fact precisely the 
opposite-to preserve intact each immigrant's self-reliance. After 
recounting the various modes of assistance provided by the 
Commissioners, Kapp explained that to lend an immigrant such aid was 
"not to treat him as a pauper, with the ultimate view of making him an 
inmate of an Almshouse, but as an independent citizen."56 He continued: 
For, whenever the poor immigrant is fleeced by rogues, his judgment 
is impaired, his energy is diminished, and in general that moral 
53. ANNUAL REpORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FOR 
THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1868, at 33-34 (1869). 
54. FRIEDRICH KAi'P, IMMIGRATION AND THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION 63-84 (1870). 
55. Id. at 85. President Grant likewise endorsed the protection of immigrants as the primary goal 
of regulation. In his message to Congress opening the 1871 session, Grant urged: "The number of 
immigrants, ignorant of our laws, habits, etc., coming into our country annually, has become so great, 
and the imposition practiced upon them so flagrant, that I suggest congressional action for their 
protection." The following year, Grant sent a special message to Congress urging the protection of 
immigrants against "the knaves who are ready to despoil them." CONGo GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 
3431 (1872), quoted in HUTCHINSON, supra note 13, at 61. 
56. KApP, supra note 54, at 85. 
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elasticity lost which he needs more than ever to start well in a strange 
land; and thus a heavy injury is inflicted on his adopted country, 
which, instead of self-relying, independent men, receives individuals 
who are broken in spirit, and, at least for a time, useless, who are 
burdensome to themselves and to others.57 
According to this view, instances of dependency and vice among 
immigrants were not so much a foreign import as the result of immigrants' 
infection by the baleful influences they encountered upon arrival in New 
York. By protecting New York's newest residents, the Commissioners 
defended society less from a foreign menace than from its worst native 
elements. 
The Commissioners' services were supported by the "Immigrant Fund," 
the source of which was, crucially, not the public purse, but the 
immigrants themselves. Under New York law, upon landing each 
immigrant was required to pay a small, non-refundable, commutation fee, 
known as "head money," which ranged over time between one dollar and 
two-and-a-half dollars.58 The immigrant who received assistance from the 
Commissioners, Kapp insisted, was "not a pauper, but a person legally 
entitled to protection by virtue of the payment of the head money."59 The 
Commissioners rendered their services not as a form of charity; rather, 
Kapp explained, the "commutation fund is the consideration of a contract 
between the immigrant and the State of New York, by which the latter 
binds herself to protect him on his arrival, and for the period of five years 
thereafter provide him with shelter if destitute, and with medical and other 
aid if sick."60 By characterizing the relationship as a contract-the 
preeminent postbellum symbol of economic freedom-the Commissioners 
preserved the appearance of immigrants' independence and self-reliance.61 
57. /d. at 160. 
58. [d. at 97-98. After the United States Supreme Court held in The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 
283 (1849), that a New York law imposing an outright tax on newly landed immigrants was an 
unconstitutional regulation of foreign commerce, New York revised the law to require instead that 
each and every foreign arrival post to the Commissioners a 300 dollar bond, which would be returned 
to the immigrant after five dependency-free years, in order to indemnify the state against the cost of 
his support. The sum was so high, the legislature knew, that the vast majority of immigrants would be 
either unwilling, or, more likely, unable to produce it. As an "alternative," the state permitted each 
immigrant instead to pay the commutation fee. 
59. Kapp, supra note 39, at 20-21. 
60. [d. at 27-28. 
61. In so rendering the relationship, Kapp and the other Commissioners elided the fact that 
immigrants' payment of the head money was anything but voluntary-indeed, it was extracted by the 
Commissioners as a condition of landing. They also obscured both the staggering inequality in the 
parties' bargaining positions and the coerciveness of the bargain itself. 
The Commission was at the forefront of redefining economic freedom in other ways, as well. The 
agency operated a formal "Labor Exchange," which, the institution's Superintendent explained, 
functioned as "a free market for every kind of emigrant labor, open to employers from all parts of the 
United States." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1867, at 78 (1868). While to a skeptical postbellum labor 
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The Commissioners insisted that the administration of the immigrant 
fund was a straightforward police function, and therefore the exclusive 
province of the State of New York. "The care of the immigrant, after he 
lands," wrote Kapp, "is purely a police regulation, in which the people of 
the State where he lands are so exclusively interested.,,62 Rejecting calls 
from some quarters for a "national board of emigration," Kapp contended 
that 
[the] authority of the federal legislative power ... ceases after the 
immigrant has landed and put himself under the operation and 
protection of State laws. For Congress to attempt ... to collect from 
him any tax, or to assume his support, would be not less absurd than 
if it were to undertake to license the boarding-house where he puts 
Up.63 
The Supreme Court's 1837 decision in New York v. Miln,64 confirming 
the state's authority to regulate the landing of immigrants, encapsulates 
the Commissioners' traditional position. The Court upheld a 1824 New 
York law requiring ship masters to report all passengers' names, ages, and 
places of prospective settlement, as a proper exercise of the state's police 
function. In so holding, it decisively rejected a challenge to the law as an 
unconstitutional regulation of foreign commerce. The reporting 
requirement, observed the Court, was "obviously passed with the view to 
prevent [the state's] citizens from being oppressed by the support of 
multitudes of poor persons, who come from foreign countries, without 
possessing the means of supporting themselves."65 In light of such a 
purpose, the Court could imagine "no mode in which the power to regulate 
internal police could be more appropriately exercised."66 In 1837, and, 
indeed, in 1870, pauperism was widely viewed as a local problem, 
"internal" to, rather than transcendent of, the jurisdiction of individual 
states.67 As Miln suggests, this was true regardless of whether the 
unionist such a scene-particularly the image of employers "shopping" for the immigrant laborer of 
their choice-must have dramatized a morally objectionable commodification of labor, to the 
Commissioners it was a tribute to free labor. According to Kitty Calavita, such private labor 
exchanges, most of which "were concentrated in New York . . . directly opposite the Castle Garden 
depot," were "the primary mechanism by which immigrant labor was distributed for several decades." 
The exchanges advertised and provided thousands of workers "at a moment's notice" for a fee of only 
one dollar, often at very low wages and to employers who used them as strike breakers. CALAVITA, 
supra note 13, at 46-47. 
62. Kapp, supra note 39, at 22. 
63. [d. 
64. 36 U.S. 102 (1837). 
65. [d. at 141. 
66. !d. 
67. Twelve years later, in The Passenger Cases, the Supreme Court struck down a New York 
State law imposing a two-dollar tax on every immigrant, as an unconstitutional regulation of foreign 
commerce. The Court was highly fragmented, with each Justice in the five-Justice majority issuing a 
separate opinion. Yet even the opinion that expressed the most forceful determination to beat back 
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pauperism at issue was of the ordinary, domestic sort, or a European 
import. 
On the one hand, the Court's distinction in Miln between the 
circumscribed authority of the federal government and the comparatively 
expansive regulatory power of New York was grounded firmly in 
nineteenth-century federalism. Yet Kapp' s strong advocacy of state-level 
control was animated at least as fundamentally by what he believed to be 
the Commissioners' main purpose-the protection of immigrants. "The 
transfer to the National Government of the control of the immigrant," 
Kapp wrote, "would ... so increase the cost of supporting [him], as either 
to quadruple the present tax, and then make it virtually a prohibitory one, 
or to impose a burden on the national treasury, and thus make the 
immigrant the nation's pauper." If the immigrant's contractual relationship 
with New York were abrogated, Kapp worried, his dependency would 
become manifest. "[E]very cent spent from the national treasury for the 
immigrant can only injure his condition and the proper appreciation of his 
value. . .. One of the worse consequences" of such a development, he 
continued, "WOUld be that immigration would speedily become a political 
question, and as such the subject of strife among demagogues, and that cry 
against the 'importation of foreign paupers' would doubtless be raised by 
which the condition of the immigrants would be deeply affected."68 This 
reasoning makes explicit the conjoined ideological and institutional stakes 
of the Commissioners' construction of immigrants as independent. Any 
appearance of chronic dependency, they believed, could place political 
support for immigrants, and thus the state's capacity to protect them, in 
serious jeopardy. 
In pleading their case to the nation, the Commissioners not only 
appealed to the public's concern for the well-being of the immigrants; they 
also linked their protection to the best interests of the United States. Kapp 
explained: 
While New York has to endure nearly all of the evils, the other States 
reap most of the benefits of immigration. New York protects and 
shields the immigrant in his health and property, and rising 
communities of the West flourish upon the fruits of her vigilant care. 
Our state acts, so to speak, as a filter in which the stream of 
immigration is purified: what is good passes beyond; what is evil, for 
the most part, remains behind. Experience shows that it is the hardy, 
virtually any attempt by the states to infringe Congress' exclusive authority to regulate foreign 
commerce conceded that a state could demand from immigrants a "security to indemnify the public 
should they become paupers." Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283,406 (1849) (McLean, J.). 
68. KAPP, supra note 54, at 156. As this statement suggests, even in the era of relative confidence 
there existed a minority who attributed poverty to foreign pauperism. See supra text accompanying 
note 36. 
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self-reliant, industrious, wealthy immigrant who takes his capital, his 
intelligence, and his labor to enrich the Western or Southern States .. 
. [while a] large proportion of those who remain here is made up of 
the idle, the sickly, the destitute, the worthless, who would become a 
burden instead of a help to our people, were it not for the wise 
institution of [the immigrant] fund. 69 
The value that the nation reaped from immigration, in other words, was 
inextricably dependent upon the authority of New York to assist 
immigrants in their needs while preserving their independence. The 
administration of Castle Garden-the landing depot for all immigrants 
arriving in New York-was calibrated to do precisely that. The 
Commissioners believed that by extracting from immigrants a "premium 
on a policy of health insurance"7o and in return providing assistance to 
those who required it-in effect, offering itself up as the nation's filter-
New York performed a great service for which the nation should be 
grateful, rather than jealous. 
II. "FOREIGN PAUPERISM" AND THE EMERGENCE OF MASS DEPENDENCY, 
1873-1883 
Concern over economic dependency was certainly not new in the Gilded 
Age. Government officials and relief workers in cities such as Boston and 
New York had confronted intermittent, if relatively brief, episodes of 
widespread poverty since the 1820s-most acutely during the depression 
years between 1837 and 1842, and again in 1857.71 Before the 1870s, 
however, such economic downturns were viewed as aberrant and 
unnatural departures from an otherwise healthy and prosperous economy. 
It was only with the devastating depression beginning in 1873 that mass 
dependency began to be understood as a chronic, entrenched problem, and 
that it attracted the sustained attention of not only charity administrators 
and policymakers, but also political intellectuals, social scientists, and the 
middle-class pUblic.72 Since at least the early part of the nineteenth 
century, lawmakers, charity administrators, and economists had 
sometimes diagnosed poverty as an individual moral matter. They worried 
69. KAPP, supra note 54, at 157-58. 
70. /d. at 158. 
71. Beginning in the late 1860s, northern state legislatures enacted harsh anti-begging statutes, 
under which able-bodied men convicted of begging could be subjected to forced labor. Such measures, 
however, were less a response to mass joblessness per se than an attempt to symbolically shore up the 
often-porous boundary line between "honest" wage laborers and "dependent" beggars." See STANLEY, 
supra note 6, at 98-137. 
72. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN 
AMERICA 66-67 (1986); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, OUT OF WORK: THE FIRST CENTURY OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 250-52 (1986); WALTER 1. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO 
WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 76-78 (5th ed. 1994). 
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about the "pauperizing" effects of indiscriminate charity, sought to instill 
habits of industry, frugality, and self-sufficiency by extracting labor in 
exchange for alms and, from at least the l840s, made the surveillance of 
poor families the cornerstone of "rehabilitation.'m Yet for the first two-
thirds of the century, charity professionals and public commentators 
nevertheless retained a basic faith in the capacity of the vast majority of 
households to contain, or privatize, dependency. Charity administrators 
continued to work primarily through households, and instances of 
institutional care, though growing, were still viewed as exceptionaP4 
This Part describes the appearance in the 1870s of the first crisis of 
mass dependency, and analyzes its impact on northerners' understanding 
and governance of European immigrants. Section A describes how charity 
administrators and political intellectuals interpreted mass dependency 
principally as a moral, rather than an economic, problem, and blamed 
misadministered charity for sapping men's natural inclination to labor in 
support of their families. Most importantly, they identified poor 
households-long the basic units of repUblican independence-as the 
source of "hereditary" pauperism. This was a form of heredity, however, 
far more mutable and susceptible to reform than that of the coming 
decades. Section B demonstrates that charity administrators and others 
increasingly associated the apparent scourge of pauperism with European 
immigrants. As with the northern "pauper class" in general, however, such 
73. KATZ, supra note 72, at 40-42, 165·66; TRATINER, supra note 72, at 49-73, 92-93. The 
Victorian "casework method," under which female, middle-class "friendly visitors" regularly 
investigated the homes of aid applicants, was similarly premised on the assumption that poverty was 
primarily the result of a defective, immoral character, which could be "cured" through regular contact 
with one's social betters. See LoRI D. GINSBERG, WOMEN AND THE WORK OF BENEVOLENCE: 
MORALITY, POLITICS, AND CLASS IN THE 19TH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 196-213 (1990). 
74. Since the colonial period, policymakers had viewed the American popUlation as disciplined 
through and supported by economically independent, self-governing families. This is not to say that 
the state took a laissez-faire approach toward family life. Local, colonial, and later state governments 
took an active roll in maintaining widows, orphans, the poor, sick, and others whose "natural" 
households had disintegrated through death, desertion, or economic failure. But provision was 
accomplished almost exclusively within the framework of private households-by, for example, 
granting subsidies to families who agreed to take in the sick or needy, apprenticing out orphans and 
the children of impoverished parents, and providing incentives to marriage and remarriage. In other 
words, the state promoted social and economic order by insuring that virtually every person was the 
ward of an adult male head of household-as a wife, child, servant, or otherwise. Even in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, when a variety of public and private institutions took on some of the social 
provision formerly performed through private homes, state policy toward poor relief and family 
governance continued to reflect a basic faith in the moral and economic viability of the nation's 
households as the self-sustaining units of society. On the colonial period, see ARTHUR W. CALHOUN, I 
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1917); JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: 
FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY (1970); EDMUND S. MORGAN, ThE PuRITAN FAMILY: RELIGION 
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (1944). On the nineteenth 
century, see KATZ, supra note 72; TRATINER, supra note 72. On the diminishing force of the 
"privatization" approach to dependency in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see 
Matthew 1. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics, and the Law of Marriage in 
the United States, 1860-1920,23 L & Soc.INQ. 541, 563-77 (1998). 
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immigrants were not typically described in terms of intractable hereditary 
deficiencies. Finally, Section C argues that the discourse of foreign 
pauperism conspired with the Supreme Court's invalidation of New 
York's head-money system to transform official and popular 
understandings of the proper purpose and locus of immigration 
governance. As the broad presumption of republican fitness that had 
characterized the Commissioners' earlier work gave way to a new 
regulatory mandate-that of prohibiting the entry of the irredeemably 
unfit-pressure mounted to transfer regulatory authority from the states to 
the federal government. 
A. Economic Depression and the Moralization of Poverty 
The depression of the 1870s represented a watershed in the popular and 
political construction of dependency. The panic of 1873 inaugurated the 
most devastating economic downturn the United States had ever 
experienced, and the nearly six-year depression that followed left as many 
as a third of the nation's workers jobless. Charitable organizations were 
burdened with unprecedented throngs of jobless men, and the presence of 
adult, able-bodied heads of household begging in the streets became a 
disturbingly conspicuous symbol of social disorder.75 For the first time, 
the United States' historically professed classlessness and social mobility 
seemed genuinely vulnerable. The unique freedom and independence of 
American labor appeared to be in jeopardy, as desperation and 
dependency in the nation's cities invoked for urban observers images of 
the dreaded pauper hordes that plagued European capitals. For many 
northerners, such conditions portended the end of the young republic's 
immunity to the vicissitudes of industrial development-the end of the 
nation's presumed "exceptionalism." 
Contemporaries noted the dependency not only of individuals, but that 
of entire households.76 Impoverished families became a potent symbol of 
the era's most disturbing trends-the jeopardy of household economic 
independence, the questionable moral and economic legitimacy of the 
wage system, the instability of traditional gender roles of male economic 
provision and female dependency, and the declining moral status of the 
home as a "haven in a heartless world.'>77 The conspicuous failure of many 
75. COHEN, supra note 27, at 123; KEYSSAR, supra note 72, at 57; STANLEY, supra note 6, at 
101-03; ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICAN: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE 
GILDED AGE 39 (1982). 
76. "Mature men who headed households and were expected to be primary breadwinners," writes 
one historian, "always constituted a majority of the unemployed." KEYSSAR, supra note 72, at 95. 
77. The phrase comes from CHRISTOPHER LATSCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE 
FAMILY BESIEGED (1977). See also STANLEY, supra 6, at 138-74. The crisis of the working-class 
household was inseparable from what many contemporaries perceived as a broader assault on the 
2005] Lindsay 205 
poor and working-class families to contain and privatize dependency 
bespoke a degree of social and economic disruption far greater that that 
wrought by economic want alone. 
A broad cross-section of Gilded-Age contemporaries-professional 
charity administrators, economists, labor leaders, journalists, and policy 
intellectuals-debated the causes of this crisis of dependency, and 
struggled to formulate appropriate remedies. Though it is clear in 
retrospect that mass unemployment was inseparable from a worldwide 
depression, declining prices, wage reductions, and frequent and long-term 
layoffs, a preponderance of (though by no means all) observers drew 
conclusions that pointed principally not to the structure of the industrial 
economy or the nature of wage relations, but to the character of the poor 
themselves. The crisis, they determined, was not fundamentally economic, 
but moral; and the enemy they confronted was not poverty, but 
pauperism-a very different, much more menacing, though potentially 
more manageable, phenomenon. Charles Kellogg, the Secretary of the 
New York Charity Organization Society and one of the leading charity 
experts of the day, explained that "[p]auperism is not poverty, however 
closely they may sometimes approach each other, for personal character 
makes a worldwide essential difference.,,78 The distinction between an 
honest poor man and a pauper was a "distinction of character; a distinction 
family. Growing numbers of working-class women were working outside of the home for wages; the 
woman movement was challenging the traditional legal regime of coverture; and advocates for 
women's suffrage and more liberal divorce threatened the marital unity and the patriarchal nature of 
middle-class homes. In reality, women's labor inside and outside of the home had been crucial to 
household economies, and to the nation's industrial expansion more generally, since the birth of the 
republic. It was the increasing visibility of this labor, often in the form of wage work performed 
outside of the home, that made it appear new to postbellum observers. On women's labor, see JEANNE 
BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY 
REpUBLIC (1990); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1982); CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW 
YORK, 1789-1860 (1987). On the woman movement's challenges to the patriarchal premises of 
coverture and divorce law, and to the exclusion of women from the franchise, see KEYSSAR, supra 
note 36, at 172-96; WILLIAM LEACH, TRUE LOVE AND PERFECT UNION: THE FEMINIST REFORM OF 
SEX AND SOCIETY (1980); Elizabeth B. Clark, Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 8 LAW AND HI ST. REV. 25 (1990); Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the 
Compact of Our Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-
1878,741. AM. HIST. 836 (1987); Hendrik Hartog, Lawyering, Husband's Rights, and The Unwritten 
Law' in Nineteenth-Century America, 84 J. AM. HIST. 67 (1997); Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The 
First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 103 YALE L. J. 1073 (1994); 
Reva Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 
1860-1930,82 GEO. L. J. 2127 (1994). 
78. D.O. Kellogg, Some Causes of Pauperism and Their Cure, 9 PENN MONTHLY 267, 280 
(1878). Perhaps it was precisely because the employment of many workingmen was so precarious, and 
the boundary between familial self-sufficiency and dependency on charity so fluid, that 
contemporaries strove so intently in their representations of the economic scene to shore up the 
conceptual distance between those statuses. "The proud workingman," wrote Kellogg, "must be made 
to see that he is not confounded with the pauper. We must draw a broad line of distinction between 
penury and degradation, and by all means respect the independence and manhood of the artisan or 
laborer." Id. at 268. 
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between self-respect and self-abandonment; between self-reliant industry 
and predatory idleness; between honor and shame."79 
The crisis of mass dependency thus carried considerable ideological 
stakes. The "true science of political economy," wrote Kellogg, "must 
come, in the end, to a recognition of the fact that industry and commerce 
have a necessary dependence upon the laws of man's moral nature,-that 
the development and welfare of the individual are the basis of productive 
power and of secure wealth."so In Kellogg's free labor worldview, the 
satisfaction of workers' material and moral development, on the one hand, 
and the pursuit of industrial progress, on the other, were mutually 
dependent. Under the conditions of modem industry, no less than in the 
days of the artisan republic, Kellogg insisted, "utilitarianism ... becomes 
the humanitarianism of John Stuart Mill."SI Far more than simply a social 
or economic problem, the mass dependency of adult men thus implicated 
the very laws of economic behavior and human nature that formed the 
philosophical and moral basis of both free labor ideology and the 
economic system on which the nation's industrial progress depended. 
Onl y by restoring the defunct moral and economic natures of New York's 
paupers could charity administrators like Kellogg ensure the continued 
compatibility of the nation's "utilitarian" and "humanitarian" impulses. 
Although Kellogg and his colleagues generally agreed that the principle 
cause of pauperism was the pathology of paupers themselves,82 from what 
sources that pathology was born and of exactly what behaviors and 
dispositions it consisted were the subject of much speculation and debate. 
Theorists were virtually unanimous that misadministered charity was 
79. [d. at 273. A few years later, Kellogg elaborated on this characterization: 
Technically, a pauper is simply a person who has become dependent on the community. But a 
vast deal more is attached to the term in every mind. There is a type of character implied in it. A 
grave change, indeed, must have gone on in the individual character before a person's private 
trials can become subjects of public concern. 
D.O. Kellogg, The Pauper Question, 51 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 638, 639 (1883). It bears emphasis that 
this diagnosis derived directly from the internal logic of political economy, which northern reformers 
like Kellogg believed to be a mirror of human nature. As Nancy Cohen explains, "[e]conomic man 
proved himself in the competitive market." He "certified his worth by the prosperity he achieved for 
himself and his family." COHEN, supra note 27, at 33. According to this worldview, a man's character 
would be 'Judged according to how well he performed according to the norm of instrumentally 
rational, acquisitive economic man." [d. at 38. 
80. Kellogg, supra note 78, at 268. 
81. [d. 
82. Unlike poverty, writes social theorist Giovanna Procacci, the construction of pauperism does 
not "work essentially through economic categories." Rather, by "grafting morality onto economics," 
pauperism appears "immediately as 'unnatural' as well as antisocial, a deformity which insinuates 
itself into the natural order which the discourse of political economy ... purport[s] to establish." 
Giovanna Procacci, Social Economy and the Government of Poverty, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: 
STUDIES IN GoVERNMENTALlTY, 158, 159 (Graham Burchell, et al. eds., 1991). When pauperism is 
"understood as a cluster of behaviors, a carrier of difference," id. at 164, the goal of charity becomes 
not the elimination of poverty, but the management of "different forms of conduct." !d. at 160. 
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largely to blame for comprOIllismg men's vulnerable moral natures. 
Indiscreet charity appeared to strike at the heart of the ideal of free and 
independent labor. As one observer wrote in 1877, charity had been 
educating some hundreds of thousands of men and women to habits 
of indolence, improvidence and dishonesty, and converting them into 
parasites and vermin, by lessening their motive to self-dependence, 
self-support and frugality .... In trying to help a man outwardly, we 
injure him inwardly-undermining his self-respect, weakening his 
will, confirming his faults .... 83 
Moreover, a hasty "yielding to sympathetic impulses" not only degraded a 
man's individual character, explained another writer, but "means the 
destruction of the family,-the institution, above all others, upon which 
the happiness of mankind depends.,,84 The New York State Board of 
Charities (NYSBC)-the state agency charged with coordinating the 
administration of public and private charity-thus urged the rigorous 
inspection of all recipients of out-door relief.85 This included "frequent 
visitation, at their own homes . . . and a careful scrutiny into their 
resources, habits and capacities for labor."86 Every case "must be 
examined, put on trial, and disposed of upon its merits," pleaded another 
commentator. "[W]e must learn to administer charity as through the courts 
of law we administer justice."87 The widespread advocacy and practice of 
such intense surveillance underscores the extent to which pauperism was 
viewed by contemporaries as a true social pathology, akin to an outbreak 
of disease, that threatened the very material and ideological bases of the 
83. Charles G. Ames, Wisdom in Charity, 8 PENN MONTHLY 48, 52 (1877). The NYSBC echoed 
this view in its 1883 Report, explaining that "human nature is so constituted that no man can receive 
as a gift what he should earn by his own labor without a moral deterioration, and the presence in the 
community of certain persons living on public relief, has the tendency to tempt others to sink to their 
degraded level." STATE OF NEW YORK, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF 
CHARITIES, 155 (1884). 
84. D. MeG. Means, The Suppression of Pauperism, 27 CENTURY 700, 702 (1884). In the logic of 
the Gilded Age, the preservation of men's economic character and the perpetuation of traditional 
gendered dependencies within the home were mutually dependent. Labor spokesmen embraced the 
nexus between a man's receipt of a living wage and the proper organization of gender within the 
household. To reconcile workingmen's status as hirelings with their claim to independent manhood, 
explains Lawrence Glickman, workers struck "a bargain with the wage system which would permit the 
patriarchal family to be kept intact" by demanding wages sufficient to comfortably support a family of 
dependents. GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 43. "Living wages" would assure manly independence by 
"enabl[ing] gender to be reproduced within the wage system." !d. at 52. 
85. In the lexicon of nineteenth-century charity administration, "out-door relief' referred to 
assistance afforded-in the form of coal, food, or, less often, cash-to people who continued to live in 
their own homes, as opposed to poorhouses. 
86. NEW YORK STATE, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES 116 
(1875) [hereinafter NYSBC, EIGHTH REPORT]. 
87. Ames, supra note 83, at 53. On the rise of "social empiricism" generally in the nineteenth 
century, see MICHAEL J. LACY & MARY O. FuRNER, THE STATE AND SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1993). 
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American free labor system. 
Charity administrators sought to preserve and rehabilitate the economic 
character of their dependent clients by demanding labor in exchange for 
assistance. As the NYSBC urged in 1879, it "is a public duty to furnish 
labor to paupers on the ground of humanity. Man is so constituted, bodily 
and mentally, that happiness is found only in connection with constant and 
systematic labor."88 The Report continued: 
Labor, rigorously extracted from the pauper in proportion to his 
physical strength, contributes more than anything else to his well-
being. He sees the results of his own labor taking shape day by day, 
and his self-respect is increased in proportion .... He acquires 
manual skills and the capacity for self-restraint and self-control. ... 
He becomes conscious of a new accession of manhood, and . . . 
develops a desire to provide for himself, and to be his own master. .. 
. [L]abor is the best supplementary aid to moral teaching, and the best 
possible agency for the practical reformation of bad habits and 
character. 89 
According to the NYSBC, by compelling charity recipients to work, their 
natural disposition to economic independence through voluntary labor 
could be rehabilitated. By locating the source of dependency in the 
degradation of individual character, yet upholding the potential for 
rehabilitation, such logic effectively assuaged the problem that mass 
dependency posed for both free labor and the theory of human nature on 
which it was premised. 
Yet some charity administrators were beginning to wonder in the 1870s 
whether the propensity for pauperism might not be inherited, as well as 
created. The last third of the nineteenth century witnessed the 
popularization of evolutionary naturalism, and, most significantly, the 
adaptation of the Darwinian theories of natural selection and survival of 
the fittest to sociological analysis.90 Although the "breeding war" between 
the classes heralded by Progressive-Era eugenicists remained two decades 
away,91 the discourse of hereditary deficiency provided many Gilded-Age 
analysts with a compelling framework with which to explain just what the 
epidemic of pauperism revealed about human economic nature. As the 
88. STATE OF NEW YORK, TwELFfH ANNUAL REpORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES 261 
(1879) [hereinafter NYSBC, TwELFfH REPORT]. 
89. /d. at 262. On the importance of compulsory labor, see also STATE OF NEW YORK, TENTH 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF CHARlTlES 198 (1877). 
90. On evolutionary naturalism and the popularization of social Darwinism. see PAUL E. BOLLER, 
JR., AMERICAN THOUGHT IN 'fRANSlTlON: THE IMPACT OF EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM, 1865-1900 
(1969); CARL DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM 
IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991); RICHARD HOFSTEDTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN 
THOUGHT (1944). 
91. See generally Lindsay, supra note 74. 
2005] Lindsay 209 
NYSBC reported in 1875, the Board's investigation had proved 
conclusively that "the great mass of our pauperism is hereditary. The 
fecundity of the class . . . is something frightful. Frequently three 
generations of paupers have been found in one alms-house." Unless 
drastic measures were taken, the Report continued, this "atavism of 
poverty and crime . . . will go on in an increasing ratio for all time. "92 
"From a small beginning," NYSBC Commissioner William Letchworth 
added, "a defective line of descent is established, which in the natural 
course ... expands into a sickly growth of pauperism, through succeeding 
generations .... "93 
To argue that a trait was hereditary, however, did not necessarily imply 
the sort of intractable genetic determinism that the term invokes today. In 
the 1870s, the attribution of pauperism to defective heredity was in no way 
incompatible with the identification of "environmental" causes, such as 
misadministered charity.94 Most often, in fact, contemporaries believed 
that they worked in combination.95 Letchworth explained that even 
children born into a "defective line of descent" were 
[from] the age of two to sixteen ... forming character; their minds 
are plastic, and may be easily shaped to good resolves. The 
surrounding world is a school full of infinite teachings, and they are 
learning from it. These years of tenderness by their very nature seem 
designed by providence as a receptive period. After it has passed 
character becomes crystallized-the activities of life shut out the 
opportunities for improvement-[and] the mind does not so readily 
imbibe knowledge and form moral habits as in its early years.96 
This variety of fluid hereditarianism furnished an appealing analytical 
framework for those who were determined to redress the problem of mass 
dependency, but who were not ideologically disposed to disturb their 
liberal belief in men's natural inclination toward economic independence 
and material progress. It offered a compelling naturalistic logic with which 
to pathologize pauperism, and it placed the source of dependency squarely 
on the shoulders of the poor themselves, where free labor adherents were 
92. NYBSC, EIGHTH REpORT, supra note 86, at 108-109. 
93. NYBSC, TwELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 224. 
94. On the compatibility and coexistence of hereditarian and environmentalist accounts of human 
behavior in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see Michael Willrich, The Two Percent 
Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of American Law, 1900-1930, 16 L. HIST. REV. 
63 (1998). 
95. Letchworth and his audience would have engaged such issues through the lens of the 
evolutionary theories of French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamark. Lamarkianism, to which most 
educated Americans still subscribed in this period, theorized that traits "acquired" during one's 
lifetime could be passed on to one's offspring. See generally DEGLER, supra note 90. 
96. NYBSC, EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 86, at 175. See also Ely Van de Warker, Pauperism 
and Its Allied Offenses, 8 PENN MONTHLY 29 (1877). 
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most comfortable to have it. 
Finally, this fluid hereditarianism allowed charity professionals and 
others to make sense of mass pauperism while preserving intact their faith 
in social reform and the rehabilitation of individual character. They could 
express their declining confidence in the inherent viability of poor families 
as independent, self-sufficient social units, while simultaneously limiting 
the scope of their critique to problems that could be redressed by 
reforming the administration of charity. If degraded families were often 
the sites of "infection," the NYSBC reasoned, the appropriate remedy was 
clear. Under the subheading "Separation of Families not Always an Evil," 
the NYSBC reported in 1875 that it was 
often found that the injudicious compassion of the dispensers of 
public charity has kept families together, when regard for the moral 
welfare of children and justice to tax payers, alike demanded that 
they should be broken up and the children taken from parents 
unworthy of them and placed in orphan asylums, or, what is better, in 
respectable families.97 
That year the New York State Legislature passed a law requiring the 
removal of all children from poorhouses.98 Families that failed in their 
prescribed function of privatizing dependency not only lost their right of 
privacy, as in the case of households subjected to the surveillance of 
charitable agencies; under the discourse of hereditary pauperism, they lost 
their right to exist at all.99 
The primary role of social conditioning in the creation of even 
"hereditary" paupers bears special emphasis here. In marked contrast to 
the construction of "foreign pauper laborers" beginning in the mid-1880s, 
the paupers of the 1870s were believed to be not so much born as made; in 
the idiom of contemporaries, they were "educated," "encouraged," 
"converted," "habituated," and "degraded." 100 Even born paupers, 
moreover, could be readily unmade, or cured, through intelligent 
conditioning: Habits and character could be reformed, self-respect 
restored, and children removed from the corrupting "hereditary" influence 
of their parents while they were still in their period of youthful 
"plasticity." 101 In addition, by rendering dependency the archetypal social 
97. NYSBC, EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 86, at 108-10. 
98. 1875 N.Y. Laws 173. See also DAVID M. SCHNEIDER & ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE HISTORY OF 
PuBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE, 1867-1940, at 63 (1941). 
99. On the conditionality of domestic privacy in the nineteenth century, see Nancy F. Cott, 
Giving Character to Our Whole Civil Polity: Marriage and the Public Order in the Late Nineteenth 
Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY: NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 107-21 (Linda K. Kerber et 
al. eds., 1995). 
'100. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89. 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99. 
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pathology, Gilded-Age observers insured that "fitness"-for parenthood 
and for citizenship-would be measured by one's capacity for economic 
independence. They thus established a crucial and enduring element in the 
nation's understanding of dependency and laid the groundwork for the 
changing construction of immigration. 
B. Foreign Paupers and Hereditary Deficiency 
Along with negative conditioning and suspect heredity, charity 
administrators and others in the 1870s increasingly noted the alleged 
"foreignness" of the dependent class. By invoking the image of "foreign 
paupers" flooding into the nation's cities, these critics named as the cause 
of mass dependency a source even further a field-in both ideological and 
geographical terms-from the home-grown, exceptional, American 
system of free and independent wage labor. Through the interrelated 
discourses of hereditary deficiency, bad social conditioning, and foreign 
pauperism, they began to lay the intellectual groundwork for what would 
become, in the mid-1880s, explicitly racialist explanations for 
dependency. "In all the countries of Europe," the NYSBC reported in 
1875, "the class of population that are [sic] paupers by inheritance is 
specially marked and easily recognized."102 Through centuries of slavery 
and dependence upon the public bounty, "a great pauper class was formed 
throughout Europe from the residuum of ancient and medieval 
servitude."103 The Report continued, 
[p]olitical progress has wrought their personal freedom, but the weak 
and the ignorant among them yet retain the stamp of their far-off 
origin, and the habits which were engendered in their forefathers, 
who thronged to the doors of the monasteries to receive the proceeds 
of unwisely directed Christian charity, still cling to their descendants. 
Emigration has brought numbers of the pauper class from various 
foreign countries to our own shores . . . . [N]umbers, unchanged in 
character and tendencies, yet remain among us. They can be 
recognized by any thoughtful visitor to the homes of the poor, in our 
cities, and among the crowds who resort to the offices of the 
superintendents of the poor as eager applicants for out door relief. 104 
According to such accounts, members of this pan-European pauper class 
had been unnaturally selected for emigration to the United States precisely 
because they were the worst that Europe had to offer. Notably, the class 
included immigrants from European nations formerly believed to be the 
source of categorically desirable stock. One observer noted the recent 
102. NYSBC, EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 86, at 109. 
103. [d. at 112. 
104. /d. 
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proliferation in the United States of English "tramps," a "species with 
which everybody is more or less familiar." "Neither they nor their 
fathers," he continued, "have lived by work for centuries past .... [T]hese 
specimens were born to the heritage of a pinched idleness."105 This "new 
and strange racy,,106 had perpetuated itself in modem times "partly by the 
propagation of vagrant children, who have stamped upon them, from 
before their birth, the vagrant instinct transmitted through several 
generations of vagrant ancestors."I07 
At first glance such language resembles the kind of rigid racialist 
hereditarianism that would dominate the debates of the mid-1880s. In the 
1870s, however, economic pathology was not typically characterized as an 
indelible endowment of foreign "races," as that idea would later be 
understood. As with the construction of pauperism generally, foreign 
paupers' hereditary inheritance did not necessarily seal their fates. Shortly 
after worrying about the "vagrant instinct" "stamped" upon the "strange 
race" of English tramps, the same writer argued that through forced labor, 
the "old poison in their blood, the hatred of honest toil, ... [could] be 
sweated out of them, and their self-respect brought into wholesome action 
by the 'movement cure.",108 
Although foreignness itself was increasingly read as a marker of 
potential economic pathology, in the 1870s neither immigrants as a class, 
nor immigrants from particular nations or regions, were characterized as 
inherently unfit for free, independent labor. To the extent that "foreign 
paupers" constituted a class at all, most commentators believed, it was one 
created by the hostile action of the European governments and almshouses 
responsible for their export. As the NYSBC observed in its first "Report 
on Alien Paupers" in 1875, the "practice of pouring the scum of a 
population-the criminal classes and confirmed pauper classes-into the 
territory of a friendly State, is an invention of the very latest years."109 The 
"people of the United States," the Report insisted, "are not willing to 
support that class of indolent and hereditary paupers which have been 
smuggled into our country by the connivance or direct agency of foreign 
nations."11O In marked contrast to the explicit racialism that would enjoy 
broad appeal just a decade later, in the 1870s commentators attributed the 
plague of foreign paupers to the unnatural selection of degraded 
individuals for export, rather than to the irremediable endowments of 
\05. J.D., Tramps, Ancient and Modern, 6 PENN MONTHLY 886, 887 (1875). 
106. [d. at 890. 
107. /d. at 890-91. 
108. /d. at 892. 
109. NYSBC, EIGHTH REPORT, supra note 86, at 141. 
110. /d. at 137 .. 
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national or regional races. 
C. Restricting the Free Flow of Immigration 
Fears of foreign paupers nevertheless began to transform both the 
prevailing estimation of many immigrants' value and views about how 
their landing and admission should be administered. Within a single 
decade, both the dominant political discourse of immigration and the old 
consensus about its governance underwent a dramatic reorientation. 
Policymakers, immigration officials, courts, political intellectuals, and 
labor spokesmen reconceived the principal purpose of immigration 
regulation from defending immigrants' economic and moral agency 
against fraud and illness to defending the nation against the depredations 
of unfit foreigners. Accordingly, regulators' operational priority moved 
from assisting immigrants along the pathway to independence to filtering 
out undesirables by expanding the grounds for exclusion. 
The 1875 Supreme Court decision in Henderson v. Mayor of New 
York,1ll declaring the New York head-money system unconstitutional, was 
an important catalyst in both the federalization of immigration policy and 
in refocusing it on the selective exclusion of foreign paupers. Writing for a 
unanimous court, Justice Samuel Miller emphatically rejected New York's 
argument that its bond requirement was "a suitable regulation under the 
power of the State to protect its cities and towns from the expense of 
supporting the persons who are paupers or diseased, or helpless women 
and children, coming from foreign countries."))2 European immigration 
had "attained [such] a magnitude and importance," reasoned Justice 
Miller, that it had "become a part of our commerce with foreign 
nations."1l3 Administration of the commutation scheme thus constituted a 
regulation of foreign commerce, making it the exclusive province of the 
United States Congress. In a marked departure from the Court's reasoning 
in Miln, characterizing the regulation of foreign pauperism as a 
quintessential state police function,114 the Henderson opinion insisted that 
control over immigrants and immigration was, by its very nature, an 
essentially federal matter. "In addition to the wealth which some 
[immigrants] bring," Justice Miller wrote, "they bring still more largely 
the labor which we need to till our soil, build our railroads, and develop 
the latent resources of the country in its minerals, its manufactures, and its 
agriculture.") 15 The Justice queried: "Can it be doubted that a law which 
III. 92 u.s. 259 (1875). 
112. [d. at 268. 
I 13. /d. at 270-71. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67. 
115. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270. 
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prescribes the terms on which vessels shall engage in [the transportation of 
this labor] is a law regulating this branch of commerce?" 116 
Yet elsewhere the opinion suggests that Justice Miller's redrawing of 
the boundary line between the federal government's and the states' 
respective spheres of regulatory dominion rested less on his constitutional 
understanding of foreign commerce than on a more worldly concern with 
foreign paupers. Under the New York system, he reasoned, 
[t]he man who brings with him important additions to the wealth of 
the country, and the man who is perfectly free from disease, and 
brings to aid the industry of the country a stout heart and strong arm, 
are as much the subject of the tax as the diseased pauper who may 
become the object of charity of the city the day after he lands from 
the vessel. ... No just rule can make the citizen of France landing 
from an English vessel on our shore liable for the support of an 
English or Irish pauper who lands at the same time from the same 
vessel. 117 
In other words, the mandatory payment of head money represented a tax 
on foreign commerce, as opposed to a police regulation, precisely because 
it failed to discriminate between desirable immigrants and paupers. 
Kapp earlier had reconciled an immigrant's temporary receipt of public 
assistance with the long-term preservation of his independence by 
depicting aid furnished from the commutation fund as a form of insurance. 
Henderson now drove a conceptual wedge between any form of 
dependency and an immigrant's presumed capacity for robust labor. 
Miller's refusal to think of all immigrants as potential dependents, and his 
insistence on a sharp, categorical differentiation between immigrants 
disposed toward productive labor and those whose degraded constitutions 
predestined them for pauperism, testifies to how the association of 
economic dependency with inherited defects was beginning to infuse 
Gilded-Age political and legal culture. Further, both Henderson's legal 
result and Miller's particular reasoning suggest that the conception of 
poverty reflected in the robust federalism of the Miln decision-as a 
problem of strictly local dimension-was losing its descriptive and 
ideological salience in the new era of mass dependency. It simply no 
longer made sense in 1875 to talk about poverty as a socially, 
economically, or jurisdictionally discrete phenomenon. Rather, Henderson 
marks the way in which contemporaries were beginning to understand 
mass dependency as a problem with truly national implications for both 
the future of free labor and the quality of American citizenship. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 269. 
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By invalidating the head-money system, Henderson thus affirmed the 
more general bifurcation of immigrants into those who were fit for free 
labor and those whose inherent deficiency destined them for lives of 
pauperism. At the same time, the decision devastated New York's 
capacity to fund immigration administration, and in doing so hastened its 
turn to the federal government as the preferred locus of governance. As 
the NYSBC observed in 1879, without the head-money system, the state 
was unable to fulfill its protective mission: 
It may suffice to say that this State still suffers from the influx of 
foreign paupers, idiotic, insane and criminals, and that the evil has 
assumed proportions of great magnitude, and is steadily on the 
increase. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
1875, denying the authority of a State to levy a per capita tax upon 
immigrants, has largely impaired the efficiency of the Commissioners 
of Emigration in protecting the State against the encroachment of 
these classes. liS 
The decision "affects not only the State of New York," the Commissioners 
explained, "but all other Atlantic states," effectively "throw[ing] their 
ports wide open and leav[ing] them unprotected" against the diseased and 
dependent. 119 
The tennination of the commutation fund was thus an important catalyst 
in transfonning the prevailing regulatory posture toward immigration. Not 
only did it lend the Court's intellectual weight to the discourse of 
unfitness; it also created a pragmatic problem of funding that spurred the 
NYSBC, the Commissioners, and the public in general to reconceptualize 
the meaning of even short -term dependency. The goal of the Castle 
Garden depot moved away from transfonning temporarily needy 
immigrants into independent, vigorous laborers and toward denying entry 
to the defective class among them. In the future, the depot would serve 
less as an immigrant assistance agency, helping the needy along the 
pathway to independence, than as a carefully calibrated sieve, allowing the 
fit to pass through, while filtering out those whose present inability to 
support themselves evidenced not a need of temporary assistance, but an 
inherent deficiency of character. 
Just a few years earlier both the NYSBC and the Commissioners had 
been emphatic that the authority to govern the admission of immigrants 
resided with the states, rather than the federal government. 120 Now the 
urgent terms of the new regulatory discourse, in combination with New 
118. NYSBC, TwELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 46. 
119. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
FOR THE YEAR ENDING DEC 31,1877, at 23-24 (1878) [hereinafter NYSCE, REpORT FOR 1877]. 
120. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text. 
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York's inability to fund its operations through the collection of head 
money, led both agencies to call for swift and aggressive national 
regulation. At the instruction of the New York State legislature "to 
impress upon Congress the necessity for speedy national legislation,"121 
the Commissioners proposed a model federal immigration bill. In their 
appeal to Congress, they emphasized the traditional connection between 
the "benevolent" practice of securing immigrants "against frauds and 
depredations," and the great benefit that thus accrued to "those [regions] 
of the United States to which the tide of immigration flOWS."122 
Yet the model bill simultaneously suggested a marked departure from 
the Commission's traditional focus. The bill proposed that a national 
"immigrant fund" be appropriated by Congress and administered under the 
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, who would have the power to 
contract with state boards to "take charge of the local affairs of 
immigration," including the inspection and assistance of immigrants. 123 
The master of every ship carrying immigrants would also be required to 
make a full report on each passenger and to "specify[] whether any of said 
passengers . . . are paupers or convicts, or are lunatic, idiot, deaf and 
dumb, blind, maimed or infirm and unable to support himself or herself; 
and, if so, whether they are accompanied by, or have relatives, ready, 
willing, and able to support them.,,124 Most significant, however, was the 
Board's proposal that it be unlawful for any ship to land an immigrant 
who had been found guilty of a crime, or who, 
within six months immediately previous to the time of such arrival, 
had been the inmate of any lunatic asylum, poorhouse, or other 
institution of a similar nature, or who had received public support or 
aid, or who, at the time of arrival was unable to support himself or 
herself, and was unaccompanied by or who had not relatives ready 
willing and able to support him or her; ... such person ... shall not 
be permitted to land, but shall be ... taken back in and by such vessel 
... to the country from which he or she may have been brought .... 125 
121. NYSCE, REPORT FOR 1877, supra note I 19, at 17. 
122. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
FOR THE YEAR ENDING DEC 3 I, 1878, at 23 (I 879). 
123. Id. at 26. 
124. /d. at 23. 
125. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added). The growing urgency of the problem and the Board's 
changing emphasis were noted by contemporary observers. As The American reported in 1880, there 
was 
a large element of our immigration made up of the most destitute and worthless persons to be 
found abroad. Even the Commissioners of Immigration [sic] admit that there is need of greater 
safeguards being established to protect the country from invasion by those people which any 
country can spare, and no country can afford to import. 
Immigration, I AMERICAN 133 (1880). Another writer reported in the North American Review that as 
a general rule, the most valuable immigrants go West; while the sickly, the unenterprising, the 
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This provlSlon illustrates how the Commissioners', and, indeed, the 
nation's, understanding of both dependency and immigration was 
changing. Through it the Commissioners sought to nationalize the new 
regulatory trajectory away from shepherding newly landed immigrants 
through the transition from passengers to independent laborers, and 
toward a scheme of rigorous inspection and selective exclusion. 
Significantly, the provision made present or past receipt of public aid 
proof of unfitness. Dependency alone, in other words, was sufficient to 
warrant a presumption of undesirability. The provision thus reflected the 
emerging construction of paupers as a distinct type; .whose material 
circumstances said something unmistakable about their fitness. This 
construction represented an important step toward imagining paupers not 
only as undesirable individuals, but also as constituting a defective class. 
After several years of concerted lobbying by the New York 
Commissioners and by several state boards of charities,126 in conjunction 
with mounting public advocacy for national legislation, Congress passed 
the Immigration Act of 1882.127 The Act expressed unequivocally the 
central tenets of the Commissioners' model bill, locating the authority to 
regulate immigration in the Treasury Department, and empowering the 
Secretary of the Treasury to enter into contractual agreements with state 
commissions to "examine into the condition of passengers arriving at the 
portS."128 "[I]f on such examination there shall be found among such 
passengers any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of 
himself or herself without becoming a public charge," the law provided, 
"such persons shall not be permitted to land,"129 and the cost of their 
return shall "be borne by the owners of the vessels in which they came."130 
The Immigration Act thus placed the authority to regulate immigration 
with the federal government, just as the Henderson Court had instructed. 
Yet the 1882 Act carried much broader implications, extending beyond 
constitutional and fiscal issues to the assessment of immigrants 
themselves. New York Republican John Van Voorhis, the bill's principal 
advocate in the House of Representatives, urged that while the landing of 
vicious, and also those whose funds are exhausted, remain in New York .... Is it to be expected, 
then, that the people of the State of New York will go on taxing themselves for the privilege of 
benevolently forwarding the beller classes to the West, and retaining the inferior? 
Edward Self, Why They Come, 134 N. AM. REV. 347, 365 (1882). 
126. The Commissioners reported in 1881 that state boards of charities from Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois had collaborated on model bills, 
which they had presented to Congress each of the previous two years. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK FOR THE YEAR ENDING DEC 31, 
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127. Immigration Act of 1882, supra note 5. 
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immigrants who "learn our language, adapt themselves readily to our 
institutions, and become a valuable component part of the body-politic" 
should not be checked, there had arisen "evils incident to immigration that 
can and ought to be avoided." Van Voorhis explained: 
[Foreign] governments, ... societies, and individuals ... send to this 
country the dependent classes of Europe. . . . There is a strong 
tendency . . . to fasten upon this country the system of hereditary 
pauperism that exists in Europe. Indeed, the mass of our pauperism is 
already hereditary. Frequently in the State of New York three 
generations of paupers may be found in the same alms-house. This 
hereditary tendency is incurable. The fecundity of this pauper class is 
frightful. 131 
Although scarcely a decade earlier Kapp had celebrated the Commission's 
function as a national "filter in which the stream of immigration is 
purified,"132 by 1883 the Commissioners voiced a radically altered 
outlook. Just five months after Congress enacted the new law, they 
reported that many immigrants who pass through New York 
settle in other States, and [then] become sick and destitute, or make 
but a feeble struggle for their own support, aware of the generous 
provision of the emigrant laws of this State, return in various ways to 
the Commissioners of Emigration to be cared for by the benevolence 
of the State of New York .... Why should the State of New York 
maintain its hospitals for the care of immigrants sent from other 
States which have derived the benefits of the healthy robust laborers, 
but impose on New York the burden of their unfortunate and 
helpless? Should the period of [support] be reduced [from five years] 
to one year only, the number of the destitute and helpless sent from 
other States to be cared for by this Commission would be materially 
diminished. 133 
To the extent that the 1882 Act relieved New York of the financial burden 
of administering Castle Garden, it thus also terminated the 
Commissioners' supposedly contractual obligation to provide assistance to 
the needy. In doing so, moreover, it converted even temporarily needy 
immigrants both inside New York and out into paupers. As a result, the 
131. 13 CONGo REC. 5108 (1882). In support of his hereditarian claims, Van Voorhis cited the 
statements of a Dr. Martin B. Anderson: 
/d. 
Nothing is more unfounded than the common idea that the inmates of poorhouses in general are 
the victims of avoidable misfortune .... [Their] voluntary degradation tends by a natural law to 
reproduce itself in all their descendents. This atavism of poverty and crime, unless broken in 
upon ... will go on in an increasing ratio for all time. 
132. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
133. ANNUAL REpORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
FOR THE YEAR ENDING DEC 31, 1882, at 22-23 (1883). 
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Commissioners' former commitment to protect immigrants against the 
baleful deceptions of New York's criminal class was eclipsed by its new 
role as the state's and the nation's sentinel of pauperism. 
When the Supreme Court upheld the Act's fifty cent per capita tax in 
1884, its opinion both echoed the nation's growing anxiety about the 
fitness of its most recent arrivals and confirmed the police power function 
underlying the new federal regulatory regime. 134 Although Justice Miller, 
again writing for a unanimous Court, lodged the holding technically in the 
Commerce Clause, his reasoning was unmistakably animated by a concern 
less with foreign trade than with foreign paupers. In addition to being 
"highly beneficial to the poor and helpless immigrant," he declared, the 
statute was "essential to the protection of the people in whose midst they 
are deposited." 135 Miller then announced, without any constitutional 
argument, that it was "equally clear" that "the power to pass such laws 
should exist in some legislative body in this country."136 Miller appeared 
incredulous that after holding in Henderson that the states lacked such 
power, the Court was now being asked to decide 
that [the power] does not exist in Congress, which is to hold that it 
does not exist at all-that the framers of the Constitution have so 
worded that remarkable instrument, that the ships of all nations, 
including our own, can, without restraint or regulation, deposit here, 
if they find it to their interest to do so, the entire European population 
of criminals, paupers, and diseased persons. 137 
Miller's approval of the Act thus reflected the perceived necessity of 
filtering all new additions to the nation's popUlation. The Act's provisions, 
the Court concluded, "are aptly designed to mitigate the evils inherent in 
the business of bringing foreigners to this country, as those evils affect 
both the immigrant and the people among whom he is suddenly brought 
and left to his own resources."138 The Court's language suggests the extent 
to which it imagined the Act as the expression-at least functionally, if 
not doctrinally-of a new type of federal police power, the declared goal 
of which was to protect the health and welfare of the national citizenry 
from an unprecedented external threat of corruption. 
134. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
135. [d. at 595. 
136. !d. at 591. 
137. [d. at 591. 
138. [d. at 595. 
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III. "FOREIGN PAUPER LABOR" AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACE 
AND CITIZENSHIP, 1884-1893 
In its 1887 platform, the Republican Party dramatically announced that 
it was "unalterably opposed to the introduction of pauper labor into this 
country," and urged Congress "to pass such laws as will prevent the 
immigration of such peoples who will . . . come in competition with 
honest American laborers."139 At first blush, such a statement may appear 
reminiscent of the widespread outcry during the depression of the 1870s 
against the importation of foreign paupers. However, the curious phrase 
"pauper labor" suggests a divergent, even potentially contradictory, 
complaint. Pauper labor presented a problem that, in the mid-1880s, 
eclipsed earlier concerns about the failure of familial self-sufficiency and 
the corrupting influences of charity. As one Senate Republican explained 
in The Forum, a leading public affairs magazine, there is "a constantly 
increasing influx within our borders of classes of immigrants of a most 
undesirable character. The danger is the reduction of wages, to the injury 
of the American workman and his home and family, the debasement of the 
suffrage, and a wide contamination of society."140 The undesirable quality 
of such classes lay not in their dependency or refusal to labor for a wage, 
but rather in their willingness to labor for virtually any wage. 
Like the earlier crisis of pauperism, the problem of foreign pauper labor 
threatened the ideological and moral legitimacy of the wage contract 
itself; it did so, however, in new and far stronger terms. Critics of pauper 
labor could not point to the education in idleness furnished to immigrants 
by misadministered charity, or to immigrants' inherited predisposition 
toward dependency. To the contrary, the immigrant pauper laborers of the 
1880s and 1890s not only labored willfully for a wage; they competed in 
the labor market with a vengeance that threatened to render meaningless 
the national celebration of free, independent labor.141 
In doing so, immigrants posed to contemporaries the difficult task of 
explaining how free laborers competing in a free wage-labor market could 
degrade the industrial labor system. The Columbia University economist 
Richmond Mayo-Smith, one of the period's most-cited authorities on the 
139. Immigration Again, 45 NATION 108 (1887) (quoting platfonn). 
140. William E. Chandler, Methods of Restricting Immigration, 13 FORUM 128 (1892). 
141. The tension between the idealized understanding of the wage contract as the essence of 
economic freedom and the alleged degradation of labor entailed in the importation of foreigners was 
no doubt exacerbated by the fact that those most responsible for the perpetuation of the contract labor 
system defended the practice as the embodiment of contract freedom. Historian Gunther Peck explains 
how "padrones"-the frequent middlemen between American employers and immigrant laborers in 
search of work-often sounded like "apostle[s] of liberty of contract," invoking the "hallmarks of 
'free' labor relations-the wage contract and the right to quit-to create an extensive system of 
coercive labor relations." See Peck, supra note 13, at 852, 849. 
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economics of immigration, described the conditions that created this 
ideological problem: 
[The] so-called unskilled labor of Europe crowds into the factories of 
America, crowding out labor that was intelligent if not actually 
skilled. . . . It is here that the American or the Americanized laborer 
is being subjected to the most strenuous competition. This labor from 
Europe ... comes ready to take up any occupation in which it can 
earn a living .... All the barriers of locality, distance, custom, and 
nationality have been broken down, and like the challenger of old he 
is obliged to face every new comer. His labor is literally a 
commodity, and he is paid the market value of it without any regard 
to its cost of production or its future supply. No one employs him 
because he is a man, or a neighbor, or a compatriot, but simply 
because he will take the least wages. The national pride in him and 
his work has ceased. 142 
Could the labor market be too free? Could the uninhibited alienation of 
labor be the source of its degradation? Economists such as Mayo-Smith, 
as well as politicians, charity administers, and political journalists, 
frequently answered such questions affirmatively. In doing so, they began 
to reevaluate a number of economic and social principles that had not 
warranted much scrutiny from the nation's political and intellectual elite 
since the end of the Civil War. They questioned the simple equation of 
contractual consent with economic freedom. They wondered whether the 
freedom to compete in the American market in wage labor should not be a 
circumscribed freedom, limited by, as Mayo-Smith put it, the "barriers of 
locality, distance, and custom." They even raised the possibility that the 
presumably universal laws of human economic nature on which the 
Gilded-Age gospel of free labor was premised were, in fact, not universal 
at all. 
These were heady questions-about the nature of consent, the limits of 
freedom, and the laws of human economic nature-that bore directly on 
the moral and ideological integrity of the free labor system. Yet for its 
Gilded-Age adherents, free labor not only described an idealized 
economic world of liberal market relationships; it was also infused with 
the evolving republican values of personal independence and virtuous 
citizenship. The crisis of foreign pauper labor appeared to place these 
values, too, in grave jeopardy. By needlessly taxing public and private 
charity, the paupers of the 1870s had allegedly thumbed their noses at 
productive labor and self-sufficiency. By now robbing "American" 
workers of the wages required to ensure for their families a civilized 
142. Richmond Mayo-Smith, Control of Immigration, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 197,223 (1888) (emphasis 
added). 
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standard of living, the new economic pathology of pauper labor not only 
degraded the market in wage labor; it promised to destroy the very fabric 
of the republic-the respectability, personal independence, and political 
virtue of its citizenry. This pathology threatened to drive a conceptual 
wedge through the center of American free labor ideology, decoupling and 
rendering incompatible the citizenly virtues so essential to the political 
health of the republic, and the economic instrument on which the 
American industrial order depended-the wage contract. 
Most contemporaries were not ideologically disposed to question either 
their bedrock faith in the utility and justice of the wage contract, or their 
republican political commitment to the preservation of a virtuous, 
independent citizenry. Nor could critics of foreign pauper labor attribute 
this new national bout of economic pathology to an "education in 
idleness" furnished by misadministered charity or to European schemes to 
rid the continent of the dregs of its popUlation. Such explanations simply 
could not speak to the particular exigency of the new crisis-the 
pathology not of pauperism, but of pauperizing labor. Instead, critical 
attention turned almost exclusively to the hereditary endowments-the 
inherent difference-of pauper laborers themselves. Politicians, social 
scientists, charity administrators, and journalists adapted their 
constructions of difference to speak specifically to the new circumstances. 
As a result, their diagnoses of immigrants' allegedly pathological 
economic behavior-the hollowness of their consent, their willingness to 
labor under servile conditions for starvation wages, and their degraded 
standards of civilization-became focused almost exclusively on the 
alleged foreignness of its origins. Political intellectuals increasingly 
characterized the debased condition of foreign pauper laborers as one that 
was unalterably fixed from birth, impervious to reform or acculturation, 
and, most significantly, as the inexorable consequence of their national 
"racial" endowments. Rather than conclude that industrialization had set 
the American labor system and American citizenship on a collision course, 
these critics instead opted to refine the meaning and the scope of both. In 
the end, they determined that if liberal notions of consent, freedom, and 
economic nature no longer seemed to describe the behavior of a growing 
class of laborers, the solution was not to revisit those principles, but to 
exclude from the American market the people to whom they did not seem 
to apply-those whose apparently different natures set them outside of the 
liberal economic universe. Their remedy was to enact new eligibility 
requirements for would-be free laborers, and to usher in a new era of 
federal regulation. 
This Part analyzes the northern critique of, and campaign to regulate, 
foreign pauper labor. Section A reviews the congressional and public 
debate that culminated in the passage of the Contract Labor Act of 1885. 
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That debate was, at bottom, a contest over the nature of personal 
independence, contractual freedom, and consent in the industrial era-that 
is, over the very meaning of free labor. Section B explores how critiques 
of European immigrants' pathological economic behavior merged with the 
proto-racial logic of evolutionary fitness. It argues that critics of foreign 
pauper labor transformed the fundamental terms of American political 
economy through the emerging discourse of American "civilization," 
supplanting the independent producer with the civilized consumer as the 
basic unit of good citizenship. Section C demonstrates how 
contemporaries lost their former faith in the assimilative powers of 
economic and political freedom, and concluded that European hordes 
threatened to contaminate not only the American wage labor market, but 
also the racial fitness of the citizenry. Finally, Section D argues that from 
the debates over the successive Gilded-Age crises of dependency and 
foreign pauper labor there emerged a fundamentally novel understanding 
of the American citizenry. The health of this new national body would 
depend less on the uplifting influences of American values and institutions 
than on the quality of its "stock." This new image, moreover, operated as a 
key premise of an inchoate federal police power. 
A. What is "Free Labor"?: The Contract Labor Act of 1885 
The heated public and political debate over the problem of foreign 
pauper labor centered on how best to protect the republic against, as one 
Republican Senator put it in 1885, a loathsome "class of contracts that 
have sprung up in the last eight or ten years."143 Kansas Republican 
Preston Plumb explained the practice of "foreign contract labor" and its 
attendant evils to his colleagues: "While the United States Government 
opens its doors to all voluntary immigration, it should most unequivocally 
close its doors against all involuntary immigration, or against any 
immigration which comes in here under contracts to labor for a period of 
years." "Such immigration, such labor" was, in Plumb's estimation, "to all 
intents and purposes slave labor, and it can under no circumstances do 
anything else than degrade and debase free American labor."l44 
Led by Ohio Democrat and former union president Martin Foran, 
Congress obliged calls for legislation--calls not only by legislators, but 
also by labor spokesmen, economists, and journalists of diverse political 
stripes-and passed the Contract Labor Act of 1885, which President 
Cleveland promptly signed into law. 145 The Act provided: 
143. 16 CONGo REC. 1785 (1885) (statement of Sen. Warner Miller). 
144. 16 CONGo REc. 1778 (1885). 
145. Contract Labor Act of 1885, supra note 5. Although the Act drew support from a relatively 
wide range of ideological constituencies, its principal political impetus, as well as its actual text, came 
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[It] [s]hall be unlawful ... to prepay the transportation, or in any way 
assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or 
aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, in the United States, ... under 
contract or agreement . . . made previous to the importation or 
migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners to perform 
labor or service of any kind in the United States .... 146 
The law, which was also known as the Foran Act, was rendered nearly 
ineffectual by poor funding, weak enforcement mechanisms, hostile 
treatment by the federal courts, and the fact that only a small fraction of 
European immigrant laborers actually arrived in the United States "under 
contract.,,147 The national debate surrounding its enactment nevertheless 
proved to be an indispensable chapter in the evolution of free labor 
ideology, the construction of "pathological" economic behavior as a racial 
trait, and the federalization of American immigration law. Opponents of 
contract labor were tasked with explaining how, if the wage contract was 
the preeminent instrument of individual economic freedom, European 
workers who traveled to the United States after having consented to labor 
for a particular employer for a given wage and duration, could be guilty of 
"degrad[ing] and debas[ing] free American labor."148 The mostly southern, 
Democratic, congressional opponents of the Contract Labor Act appeared 
to revel in what they suggested was the ideological inconsistency of the 
Act's "free labor" proponents. Senator John Morgan, an Alabama 
Democrat and former Confederate General declared, "there is no more 
vicious system of legislation that has ever been conceived of ... than that 
of converting the obligation of a contract or the making of a contract into a 
crime." "Contracts in some form attend almost every act of our social and 
domestic relations," he continued, "and to denounce those as crimes that 
are in themselves innocent is to endanger every relation and duty of 
life.,,149 Morgan and several of his allies intimated repeatedly that the very 
directly from the labor movement. A Knights of Labor attorney drafted the statute, and the Knights 
recruited Congressman Foran, a former union president, to sponsor the legislation. See FITzGERALD, 
supra note 20, at 116; Forhath, supra note 37. 
146. [d. § I. 
147. On the ineffectiveness of the 1885 Act, see CALAVITA, supra note 13, at 52·66. William 
Forbath notes that courts narrowed the Act's scope of application by holding that arrangements 
between employers and would-be immigrant employees that fell short of formal contracts did not 
violate the Act's prohibition against contract labor. See Forbath, supra note 37. 
Gunther Peck intriguingly suggests that the Act may even have exacerbated the problem of contract 
labor. By "creating hurdles" for immigrants who had already secured a job before entering the United 
States, Peck writes, "the Foran Act actually increased the need for immigrant middlemen to help guide 
workers across the border. The more rigorously the Foran Act was enforced, the more stature padrones 
gained in the eyes of American corporate officials by their demonstrated ability to circumvent the 
law's requirements." Peck, supra note 13, at 854. 
148. See supra text accompanying note 144. 
149. 16 CONGo REC. 1631-32 (1885). Morgan continued: "[I)t is vicious legislation ... because it 
violates the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon race in legislation by converting the ordinary and natural 
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same legislators who just two decades earlier had been so eager to strip the 
South of its oppressive, status-encrusted social and economic system and 
to usher in a liberal regime of consent and contract were now committing 
the worst kind of hypocrisy. 
Congressional proponents of the Act-a coalition of Republicans and 
northern, pro-labor Democrats (a number of whom had previously held 
union leadership positions)-responded that laborers "imported" under 
contract lacked the volition requisite for meaningful consent. Contract 
laborers were moved to immigrate not by the freedom of their wills, they 
argued, but rather at the initiative of American employers. Michigan 
Republican Byron Cutcheon maintained that the legislation was designed 
"to exclude the ... degraded ... [and] almost servile laborers who come 
here moved not by the healthy normal impulse, but incited and instigated 
by the mercenary agents of corporations."150 A young Theodore Roosevelt 
similarly urged "that as bread grows cheaper human flesh should be 
dearer." "The capitalist who aids in the importation of cheap labor, with a 
view to increasing 'competition in the labor market,'" he chided, was a 
"dangerous enemy to society .... The man who imports degraded laborers 
is also importing unworthy citizens; and is therefore committing a 
peculiarly contemptible species of treason against the Republic."151 
Roosevelt's references to "importation" reflect the growing view that 
contracts formed prior to immigrating deprived foreign laborers of 
meaningful agency. For such critics, the mere fact of a contract no longer 
signified unequivocally a laborer's freedom and independence. Further, by 
placing the phrase "competition in the labor market" in quotation marks, 
Roosevelt suggested the extent to which the crisis of pauper/contract labor 
had prompted contemporaries to critically reevaluate the meaning and 
consequences of free, unfettered competition. 
True contractual freedom, urged congressional proponents of the 
Contract Labor Bill, required a type of informed consent that could only 
be had through first-hand knowledge of American economic and social 
conditions. Representative Foran explained that the "species of 
immigration with which this bill seeks to deal" is comprised of men who 
rights to make a contract into a crime." Id. at 1632. 
150. 15 CONGo REC. 5369 (1884). 
151. Theodore Roosevelt, The Immigration Problem, 7 HARV. MONTHLY 85, 86-87 (1888). 
Labor advocates similarly placed the initiative for immigration under contract solely on the employers. 
Terence Powderly, the labor spokesman most frequently cited by members of Congress, insisted that, 
if immigrants were to prove "beneficial and healthy" to the nation, they must come "of their own 
volition." Terence V. Powderly, A Menacing Irruption, 147 N. AM. REV.165, 165 (1888). Instead, he 
bemoaned, a very large class "come(] here under contract or after undue influence has been brought to 
bear on them by agents of American employers." Id. at 168. "They come as paupers," Powderly 
continued, "and as paupers they remain; they come to compete in the struggle for food with the 
American workman." Id. at 169. 
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do not come "of their own volition," and who "perhaps had never heard of 
America; they certainly know nothing of our institutions, our customs, or 
of the habits and characteristics of our people."152 Senator James George, a 
Mississippi Democrat, similarly instructed that the "difference between 
servile labor or slave labor and labor performed under a contract made 
with an ignorant foreigner, unacquainted with our language, unacquainted 
with the price of labor here, is very little in practical effect.,,153 For these 
legislators, formal consent was insufficient; true volition required specific 
knowledge not only of the labor market into which immigrants were 
entering, but also of the "customs" and "habits" of American laborers. 
As such statements indicate, the contest over contract labor was, at 
bottom, a debate over the precise meaning of free labor. Far from backing 
away from their rhetorical and ideological commitment to the wage 
contract, the bill's proponents presented the legislation as a necessary 
defense of free labor against the threatened restoration of a new form of 
bondage. Few advocates of the legislation could resist invoking the 
analogy between foreign contract labor and chattel slavery. The enactment 
of the Contract Labor Bill, they argued, would be but the latest victory in 
the historical struggle to ensure the freedom of all labor. It is "part of a 
great work in which I have been engaged here for the last twenty-five 
years," declared Senator Plumb, "that all labor in this country shall be 
absolutely free." "He who sells his effort sells his life. He who ties his 
hands," Plumb dramatized, and "winds about the muscles of his body the 
chains of a contract made abroad, is a slave, and it is against slavery that 
this bill is aimed."154 Just as abolitionists and the architects of 
Reconstruction earlier had forged the wage contract into a token of 
freedom, Gilded-Age critics of contract labor invoked the image of human 
bondage once again to refine the meaning of free labor. 155 
Critics of contract labor contended that in times past the very act of 
immigration had itself entailed a certain test of individual fitness for the 
152. 15 CONGo REC 5349 (1884). 
153. 16 CONGo REC 1794 (1885). 
154. 16 CONGo REC 1783 (1885). Such statements were ubiquitous in the congressional debate 
over the Contract Labor Bill and in leading national publications. 
ISS. Further, for such critics the economic dependence of unskilled, poorly paid industrial 
hirelings translated directly into their dispossession of political will. Terence Powderly, among others, 
raised the specter of "raw, undisciplined, willing serfs ... being used as voting instruments which 
neutralize the best efforts of patriots." Dependent, foreign workers were "more docile," Powderly 
explained, "and though they may never be able to understand the English tongue, if they become 
citizens they will know how to vote as the owner of the mill wishes." Powderly, supra note lSI, at 
173. In one company, he recounted, new hires "were told by the owner of the mill that he expected 
they would vote in accordance with his wishes." /d. at 171. Notably, even many employers, who had 
long trumpeted the economic benefits of free European immigration, joined the restrictionist chorus. 
Confronted with mounting labor conflict and union militancy in the mid-1880s, business leaders 
increasingly identified "foreign radicals" as the source of the unrest, and viewed immigrants as 
potential agents of economic and political instability. HIGHAM, supra note II, at 52. 
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American market in competitive labor. In recent years, however, the 
severity of the conditions that compelled many desperate Europeans to 
immigrate to the United States had, along with the assistance furnished by 
American employers, abrogated that vital test. Railroad president and 
future Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo insisted that the 
unemployed European laborer was, "without choice or provision, . . . 
chased by starvation and necessity, together with his more wretched 
family, into the crowded hold of a great steamship."156 He continued: 
Such an immigrant is forced to come ... out of the pain and pinch of 
a necessity which our [tariff] laws have forced upon him. ... 
Frequently he becomes a chattel, a serf, with a number instead of a 
name, a piece of brutalized, degraded, human machinery, consigned 
in a freight car to some great corporation. 157 
Such immigrants, McAdoo suggested, were not the industrious, freedom-
loving, independence-seeking workers that Commissioner Kapp had 
celebrated just two decades earlier. They were virtual chattel, evacuated of 
agency and individuality by forces beyond their control. 
Critics of pauper labor likewise worried that the relative ease and low 
cost of migrating to the United States had removed an important trial of 
economic fitness. Francis Amasa Walker, perhaps the era's preeminent 
political economist and the future Chief of the United States Census 
Bureau, explained that an improved European railway system and the 
lowering of the price of passage to the United States had "reduce[d] 
almost to a minimum the energy, courage, intelligence, and pecuniary 
means required for immigration." The result, Walker feared, was a class of 
immigrants comprised "no longer [of] the more alert and enterprising 
members of their respective communities, but rather the unlucky, the 
thriftless, the worthless." 158 Mayo-Smith described the problem in 
explicitly Darwinian terms: ''The process of natural selection which the 
difficulties of the voyage formerly brought about, no longer works. 
Practically anyone can now go .... "159 Degraded laborers who 
immigrated with such unfortunate ease "can scarcely be said to be 
following out natural economic impulses leading them to better their 
156. William McAdoo, Immigration and the Tariff, II FORUM 398, 402 (1891) (emphasis 
added). 
157. Id. at 402 (emphasis added). 
158. Francis A. Walker, Immigration and Degradation, II FORUM 634, 643 (1891). The 
immigrant's "arrival at our shores," explained another critic, "no longer proves anything in favor of 
his character." Only a "few dollars," he continued, "stand in the way of any inhabitants ... from the 
most degraded cesspools of the world's population, coming to this country." Noble Canby, 
Immigration, 16 CHAUTAUQUAN 197, 198 (1892). 
159. Richmond Mayo-Smith, Control of Immigration, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 46, 76 (1888). 
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condition and thus indirectly to benefit the world at large." 160 The trope of 
unnaturalness in this passage is significant. By attributing immigrants' 
allegedly pathological economic behavior to the unnaturally selected 
deficiencies of their character, Mayo-Smith elaborated one of the key 
ideas according to which the old, eroding "barriers" around the free labor 
market would be affirmatively reinforced. "For the country receiving the 
immigrants," Mayo-Smith continued, "it is a misfortune that this natural 
selection has fallen away. To go on receiving them, without check or 
control, is like attempting to guide a heavily loaded wagon down hill, with 
the wheels greased and the brakes off, because it had been done before 
successfully with the brakes on.,,161 Congress did indeed reapply the 
"brakes," and calibrated them with an eye toward the perceived racial 
unfitness of particular national groups. 
B. Citizenship and Civilization: Discovering the "American Standard of 
Living" 
The understanding of hereditary unfitness articulated in the 1880s and 
1890s drew in part on existing theories about the inheritability of 
economic pathology. The construction of pauper laborers as members of 
categorically suspect national groups nevertheless marked an important 
conceptual departure, insofar as it folded immigrants' allegedly 
"unnatural" economic behavior into a proto-racial discourse of 
evolutionary fitness. Critics of foreign pauper labor increasingly judged 
would-be free laborers against the emergent notion of "civilization." As 
the previous Section demonstrated, the eroding thrift and industry among 
immigrants that charity administrators in the 1870s were so concerned to 
rehabilitate returned with a vengeance in the crisis of pauper labor. "The 
trouble," Mayo-Smith explained, "is their economy does not stop at a 
point where it would be desirable." Instead, "[t]heir standard of life is one 
which it would be a serious misfortune for the American laborer to 
imitate. Their wants have been reduced to a point where low expenses no 
longer indicate economy, but lower civilization."162 
The greatness and durability of American civilization, commentators 
explained, depended upon the virtue and fitness of its working class; 
nothing assured that fitness better than the high wages and living standards 
demanded by American workers. 163 "The American producer is the 
160. /d. at 77. 
161. [d. 
162. [d. at 74. 
163. Securing an "American standard of living," Glickman explains, became the principal goal of 
Gilded-Age labor agitation: "Living wages made it possible to avoid slavery and achieve republican 
freedom .... The new slavery, in this context, was a low standard of living, and the new republican 
freedom was the American standard of living." GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 79. As a group of labor 
2005] Lindsay 229 
essential ingredient . . . in American civilization," explained New 
Hampshire Republican Senator Henry Blair. He is an "American civilizer 
[who] has attained a position where he has a certain amount of 
compensation ... allotted to him in the distribution of that which he 
produces .... He gets his share, and in America he gets a larger share ... 
. "164 Congressman Foran similarly emphasized the explicit connection 
between high wages and American laborers' capacity for fit citizenship. 
"It may be laid down as a general proposition that can not be controverted, 
that the rate of wages determines the social, moral, and intellectual status 
of a people," he explained. "Low wages mean cheap men, ignorant, 
degraded, dangerous citizens. . . . Cheapen labor and you destroy the 
incentives that spur men to effort and improvement. Low wages signify 
debasement, ignorance, degradation, brutality. High wages signify 
intelligence, ingenuity, invention, and a higher order of manhood." 165 
Following this logic, the capacity of laborers to participate in the 
industrial economy as consumers, rather than as mere producers, became 
the hallmark of a distinctively American political economy and an 
essential ingredient in the high quality of American civilization. 166 In 
England, editorialized the Social Economist, where the middle and upper 
classes had always been the "chief consumers of manufactured products," 
political economy had "looked to them as the main source of commercial 
demand. The laborers not having appeared above the social horizon, they 
cut no figure as the consumers of factory products, and consequently were 
considered only as factors of production."167 Under such conditions "the 
doctrine of cheap labor received its first scientific sanction,"168 thus 
creating "a middle-class public policy, under whose influence the social 
condition of the masses was repressed rather than advanced.,,169 By 
leaders collectively declared in 1891, "[iJn a political sense, the high standard of living is a chief 
requirement for the preservation of republican institutions." THE VOICE OF LABOR: PLAIN TALK BY 
MEN OF INTELLECT ON LABOR'S RIGHTS, WRONGS, REMEDIES, AND PROSPECTS (H.J. Smith ed., 
1891), quoted in GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 83. 
164. 16 CONGo REC. 1626 (1885). 
165. 15 CONGo REc. 5351 (1884). 
166. Glickman explains that during the last third of the nineteenth century the American labor 
movement gradually retreated from its earlier opposition to the wage system and articulated a vision of 
"citizenship around high wages and consumption." GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 7. In contrast to the 
traditional view among workers of a just wage as the "full fruits" of one's labor, and in opposition to 
mainstream political economists' understanding of wage rates as the product of the natural law of 
supply and demand, living wage advocates maintained that "how one lived should be the criterion by 
which to judge the fairness of wages. Id. at 67. "Rather than as exploitation that inevitably fell short of 
full compensation, wages came to be defined positively in need-based language." Id. at 70. C.f JAMES 
LIVINGSTON, PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1850-1940 
(1994) (describing the increasing importance in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries of 
consumption to American subjectivity). 
167. Philosophy of Immigration and Annexation, 4 SOC. ECONOMIST 193, 195 (1893). 
168. Id. at 196. 
169. /d. at 196-97. 
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contrast, 
America represents a different type of national development and 
industrial civilization .... [O]urs, from the beginning, have rested 
upon the life and character of the masses .... America's ... present 
position at the head of civilization has been acquired, not by imitating 
England, but by inaugurating a new departure in national 
development. England's ... markets have been chiefly foreign, ours 
domestic. . . . American industries rest chiefly upon American 
consumption and American civilization. 170 
The greatness of American civilization was thus grounded in the 
distinctiveness of its political economy, the singular feature of which was 
the expectation that American workers' material consumption represented 
a meaningful source of commercial demand. Under this construction, 
which was indeed new in the 1880s, the high quality of working-class 
consumption became both a source and symbol of relative classlessness 
and social mobility in the United States, and thus a constitutive element of 
the nation's exceptionalist identity. As historian Nancy Cohen has written, 
"the republic of citizen-workers was being transmuted into a public of 
consumers." 171 
By placing a respectable working-class standard of living at the center 
of the revised definition of free labor, critics of foreign pauper labor 
helped to mollify the tense accommodation between the emergence of a 
permanent wage-earning class and the venerated republican ideal of 
virtuous citizenship. Under the Gilded-Age political economy of 
American citizenship, public virtue would be derived not only from 
independence rooted in property ownership and self-employment, but also 
from the receipt of a wage sufficient to afford a worker and his family a 
comfortable material existence and a measure of leisure. Senator Orville 
Platt, a Connecticut Republican, made explicit the vital nexus between the 
preservation of republican citizenship and the emergent definition of the 
"free" laborer as one who was well-compensated: 
[Y]ou must add to virtue and intelligence the prosperity of the 
citizen, if you expect the Republic to endure . . . . [T]o lower the 
170. [d. at 197. 
171. COHEN, supra note 27, at 200. The debate over foreign pauper labor took place against the 
backdrop of a wholesale reconstruction of American political economy in the 1880s and 1890s. As 
Cohen explains, influential economists such as John Bates Clark and David Ames Wells, along with 
United States Commissioner of Labor Carroll Wright, advanced the "emerging idea of an 'American 
standard of living' that displaced traditional ideas of economic republicanism." ld at 229. Clark, who 
pioneered the soon-to-become dominant theory of "marginalism"-which, among other innovations, 
located the source of economic value in consumer demand--expressly "equated democracy with 
consumption," and in so doing "suggested that the test of a just society was its ability to maintain 
material abundance and that participation in consumer culture constituted civic participation." /d. at 
213. 
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standard of wages below fair remuneration is VICIOUS and 
destructive of republican institutions .... Up to this time those of us 
who have been willing to labor in this country under our system of 
free labor have been able to l;omfortably clothe themselves and 
families; so that they could properly educate their children; so that by 
thrift and prudence ... [they] could ... secure a little home; attach 
themselves to the soil, and thus become conservative, patriotic 
citizens of the country .... [W]e shall but half won the fight against 
slave labor and in favor of free labor in this country if ... labor shall 
[not] be free and independent, and ... receive fair, even generous, 
compensation. 172 
A generation earlier the idea of a republic of permanent wage earners had 
seemed a logical impossibility; in the 1880s, however, a broad cross-
section of politicians, economists, journalists, and even many labor 
spokesmen could agree that generous wages and a comfortable material 
existence were sufficient prerequisites for fit citizenship in a thriving 
republic. 
Critics of foreign pauper labor took special pains to shore up the fitness 
and virtue of "native" workers. American workers' inability, or 
unwillingness, to compete with the pauper laborers of Europe evidenced 
not their weakness as free laborers, but rather their self-respect and 
relative civilization. "A large majority of these immigrants," explained an 
Indiana RepUblican, "can live on what a respectable American would cast 
aside .... American workmen pay the penalty for being respectable."173 It 
was less American workers' capacity as laborers, than their respectability 
and high standards of living that distinguished them favorably from their 
European counterparts. In the debate over foreign pauper labor, such 
extra-economic considerations gained an essential place alongside values 
such as consent and freedom in the evolving definition of free, 
independent labor. 
The determination to preserve the "civilization" of the American wage-
earning class inspired unprecedented attention to immigrant laborers' 
living conditions. Freighted with the fate of the American standard of 
living, immigrants' "habits, customs, [and] modes of living"174 became a 
barometer of their civilization. Both the Congressional Record and 
popular periodicals were replete with reports of immigrants' inability to 
172. 16 CONGo REC. 1781 (\885). 
173. William R. Wood, Unrestricted Immigration Dangerous to American Institutions, 2 AM. J. 
POL. 512, 522 (\893). Terence Powderly likewise argued that immigration was "damaging" and 
"unhealthy" because the wages accepted by pauper laborers obliged "native workmen" to "lower the 
standard of wages and living to that of the immigrant." Terence V. Powderly, Mr. Powderly on 
Excessive Immigration, 20 AMERICAN 76, 77 (\890). 
174. 15 CONGo REC. 5349 (\884). 
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appreciate the creature comforts. The consumption habits of "new" 
immigrants, particularly Italians and Hungarians-who in the 1880s were 
just beginning to arrive in notable numbers-were often singled out for 
special condemnation. During floor debate, Congressman Foran 
highlighted the testimony of one Committee witness who had reported that 
Hungarian laborers "subsist[ed] upon what an American laborer could not 
eat-such as mules, hogs, &c., which have been killed or died' with 
cholera and other diseases."175 Another witness, Foran reported, had 
confirmed that "Hungarians ... have been known to have taken the dead 
carcass of a mule, sliced it up and deal it out as rations .... [T]he habits, 
morals, and modes of living of the Italians [are] of the same general 
character."176 Terence Powderly, the leader of the enormously powerful 
Knights of Labor and the future United States Commissioner General of 
Immigration, corroborated such reports and urged that new immigrants' 
uncivilized living standards unfit them for both the American market in 
free labor and for American citizenship. "We have Hungarians at work," 
Powderly insisted, "who are no more fit to live in this country than a hog 
is fit to grace a parlor."177 Powderly's choice of metaphors was not 
accidental. As the preeminent Victorian symbol of bourgeois 
respectability, the aspiration to possess a parlor represented the prospect of 
social mobility through material consumption. The promise of such 
mobility helped to reconcile the emergence in the Gilded Age of a 
permanent wage-earning class with the exceptionalist ideal of perpetual 
classlessness. Even though the typical wage laborer would never achieve 
old-style propertied independence and economic self-sufficiency, by 
obtaining a comfortable, well-appointed home cared for by a dependent 
wife he could nevertheless stake a legitimate claim to social respectability 
and virtuous citizenship. 
To such critics, the prospect of a more civilized way of life appeared not 
even to register on the aspirational horizon of the typical foreign pauper 
laborer. Francis Amasa Walker described the "foreigner, making his way 
into the little village, bringing ... not only a vastly lower standard of 
living, but too often an actual present incapacity even to understand the 
refinements of life and thought in the community in which he sought a 
home." As a result, Walker continued, "[o]ur people had to look upon 
houses that were mere shells for human habitations, the gate unhung, the 
shutters flapping or falling, green pools in the yard."178 Not only were 
foreign pauper laborers willing to work for wages unbefitting a native 
175. 15 CONGo REC. 5350 (1884). 
176. /d. at 5350 (internal quotations omitted). 
177. 15 CONGo REC. 5356 (1884). 
178. Walker, supra note 158, at 640-41 (emphasis added). 
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cItizen-consumer; they were unable even to comprehend a civilized level 
of material consumption. 179 This critique stood in marked distinction to the 
discourse of foreign pauperism just a decade earlier. "It is not because 
foreigners become paupers that their immigration should be restricted," 
explained the political activist Ellen Dietrick in the Social Economist, "but 
that they have too Iowa standard of social life, habits, and ideas."lso 
The Supreme Court echoed this rationale when it was asked to clarify 
the class of immigrant laborers excluded by the Contract Labor Act. The 
purpose of the Act, explained a unanimous Court in the Holy Trinity Case, 
was to "raise the standard of foreign immigrants, and to discountenance 
the immigration of those who had not sufficient means in their own hands 
... to pay their passage."ISI The Court continued, quoting directly from 
the House committee report: 
This class of immigrants carers] nothing about our institutions, and in 
many instances [has] never heard of them. They are men whose 
passage is paid by the importers .... [T]hey are ignorant of our social 
condition, and, that they may remain so, they are isolated and 
prevented from coming into contact with Americans. They are 
generally from the lowest social stratum, and live upon the coarsest 
food, and in hovels of a character before unknown to American 
workmen. They, as a rule, do not become citizens, and are certainly 
not a desirable acquisition to the body politic. The inevitable 
tendency of their presence among us is to degrade American labor, 
and reduce it to the level of imported pauper labor.ls2 
In the estimation of the Supreme Court, foreign pauper laborers' 
179. See 15 CONGo REC. 5361 (1884) (statement of Rep. Ferrell). Especially troubling to critics of 
immigrants' living standards was foreign laborers' alleged inattention to the proper gendered 
organization of the household-the preeminent site of consumption. Desirable immigrants, explained 
Congressman Cutcheon, come to the United States 
with all their families, bringing their household goods and gods. They quickly learn American 
ways and American wages .... [They become] consumers. They must have a cottage .... They 
must have furniture .... They must have clothing, boots, shoes, hats, caps, and food. In short, 
they become embedded in the great American labor system, giving as well as taking, and 
investing their surplus here. 
/d. at 5369 (1884). Foreign pauper laborers and the employers who import them, Foran worried, 
instead seemed to care little that "the family is the only true foundation upon which any government 
can rest." Id. at 5349. Capitalists "herd together men and women who seem to be without a clear 
recognition of social or moral distinctions between the sexes, if we may judge from their daily life and 
the manner in which they inhabit indiscriminately their large but unfurnished sleeping apartments," 
reported Pennsylvania Congressman William Kelley. [d. at 5354. Powderly confirmed that he had 
"seen nine of them, eight men and one woman, occupying two small rooms." [d. at 5357. Such 
disregard for the proper organization of the family economy both diminished the role of the home as 
unit of vigorous consumption and made a mockery of the vaunted republican ideal of the economically 
independent, single-male-breadwinner household. 
180. Ellen Battelle Dietrick, The Restriction oj Immigration, 5 Soc. ECONOMIST 21, 31 (1893). 
181. Holy Trinity Church V. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464 (1892). 
182. [d. (quoting 15 CONGo REc. 5359 (1884». 
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degradation of the American standard of living could poison the 
independence, self-respect, and political virtue of the national citizenry. 
In a social and political milieu where fitness for free labor was virtually 
synonymous with fitness for republican citizenship, immigrants' allegedly 
low standard of material civilization necessarily weighed heavily against 
their inclusion in the political body. As Walker put it, 
[toJ be strong, a democratic society such as ours needs to have its 
members aspiring for the fullest measure of life, eager for all the 
advantages of contract and influence which can be achieved. . . . 
Where, as among peasant folk, there is no upward striving, the mass 
of the people is hardly profitable to the best interest of the 
commonwealth. 183 
This deep connection between the standards of laborers' material 
civilization, the prosperity of American citizen-consumers, and the health 
of the republic supplied a compelling argument for applying a more 
selective, and federally administered, filter to the incoming stream of 
immigration. 
C. The Hereditary Republic 
Critics of foreign laborers' allegedly sub-standard civilization routinely 
rendered their diagnoses in the increasingly resonant discourse of 
hereditary inferiority. They argued not merely that immigrants were 
disproportionately likely to be unfit as individuals-as they had in the 
I 870s-but that there existed naturally defective sub-groups of 
immigrants, which owed their unfitness for American economic or 
political inclusion largely to their very racial inheritance. Some advocates 
of more stringent immigration restrictions explicitly denied that they were 
motivated by racial animus. One of the Contract Labor Bill's principle 
proponents in the Senate, Ohio Republican John Sherman, argued that the 
proposed exclusion of pauper laborers "is not on account of their race or 
their color, but simply because they are not in a condition to share with us 
in the civilization which has been founded by free men and which is to be 
perpetuated by the free intelligent laboring men of this' country."184 This 
Section refutes that statement by revealing the subtle and not-so-subtle 
racial logic with which critics of foreign pauper labor pressed for new 
restrictive legislation. More importantly, it argues that to categorize such 
advocacy into "racial" appeals and "economic" appeals creates a false 
dichotomy. The economic arguments for tighter controls were in fact 
inextricable from the racial arguments, as immigrants' alleged economic 
183. [d. at 650. 
184. 16 CONGo REC. 1634 (1885). 
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pathology both generated and supplied the specific content of their racial 
assignments. 
The following discussion consists of three subsections. The first 
demonstrates that opponents of foreign pauper labor attributed 
immigrants' alleged lack of affinity for material consumption-their "un-
American" standards of domestic living-to their degraded racial natures. 
This logic, I argue, conflated an economic critique of labor-market 
degradation with a racial critique of social and political contamination. In 
the second subsection, I argue that the perceived menace posed by racially 
unfit Europeans forced on critics of liberal immigration a stark choice, 
between the theretofore presumed universality of their political-economic 
worldview and the survival of the republic. They chose survival, and in so 
doing decided that enjoyment of the so-called "eighteenth-century values" 
of universal rights, individual freedom, and political equality had 
necessarily become contingent on the racial natures of those claiming the 
privilege of economic and political inclusion. The third subsection argues 
that this choice both was premised on and further advanced a fundamental 
reevaluation of the nation's assimilationist faith, and compelled the 
judgment that, in order to save the nation's cherished institutions, access 
to those institutions would have to be restricted. 
1. Foreign Pauper Labor as Racial Invasion 
The contradictions that contemporaries observed between the ideal of 
free, independent labor and the ongoing crisis of dependency furnished not 
only the historical context, but also the specific logic of the racialization of 
European immigrants. The thoroughly un-American standard of living 
adopted by foreign pauper laborers, critics argued, was born less of low 
wages or poverty than of heredity, and its presence could not but poison 
the body politic. In his want of civilized motives, wrote Harvard scientist 
Nathan Shaler in The Atlantic Monthly, the European peasant immigrant 
"is essentially the same as the Southern Negro. . . . Centuries of 
experience have bred in him the understanding that he is by nature a 
peasant. ... Centuries of breeding have ... checked the development of 
all those motives and aspirations which are the foundations of our 
democracy."185 There has been "stamped in an indelible manner, the sign 
of inferiority on the laboring classes of the Old World.,,186 The analogy 
between European pauper laborers and African Americans, which was 
185. N.S. Shaler, European Peasants as Immigrants, 71 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 646, 649 (1893). 
186. /d. at 650. See also Mayo-Smith, supra note 159, at 54, 55 ("[The] negroes of the South ... 
are as much an alien element in our civilization as are the foreign-born themselves .... [Together, they 
equal] more than two-fifths of the entire population, who on account of race or birth or blood are in 
reality alien to our American popUlation."). 
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extremely common in the mid-1880s and early 1890s, must have made 
unmistakably clear the racial nature of immigrants' alleged unfitness. 
Southern blacks-formerly as slaves and in the Gilded Age as 
impoverished sharecroppers and plantation hands-had long embodied 
hereditarily fixed, racialized, dependent labor. Critics of foreign pauper 
labor thus borrowed, and, in turn, reinforced, that culturally potent racial 
accounting of economic dependency. 
Politicians and social commentators frequently heaped special 
opprobrium on the racial inheritance of the most recent, and increasingly 
visible, addition to the American laboring class-the "new" European 
immigrants. As Walker explained, the defective classes were "increasingly 
drawn from the nations of southern and eastern Europe-peoples which 
have got no great good for themselves out of the race wars of centuries, 
[and have] ... remained hopelessly upon the lowest plane of industrial 
life."187 Massachusetts Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, one of the most 
vocal advocates of immigration restriction in the House and in the political 
press, was unambiguous that the invasion of foreign laborers was also an 
invasion of foreign races. As he proclaimed to his colleagues in 1891, 
"[ w]e have now before us race problems which are sufficient to tax to the 
utmost the fortunate conditions with which nature has blessed US.,,188 The 
changing origin of immigration was vital. "The immigration of people of 
those races which contributed to the settlement and development of the 
United States is declining," he explained, "in comparison with that of 
races far removed in thought and speech and blood from the men who 
have made this country what it is.''189 Lodge included in the Congressional 
Record a chart detailing the changing character of immigration between 
1874 and 1889; though southern and eastern Europeans still constituted 
only about a quarter of the European total, the demographic trajectory was 
unmistakable. 190 
187. Walker, supra note 158, at 644. 
188. 22 CONGo REC. 2956 (1891). 
189. /d. It bears mention that Lodge, like many of his restrictionist Republican colleagues, held a 
deserved reputation as a racial egalitarian. The previous year, he had relentlessly championed a piece 
of legislation-dubbed the "Lodge Force Bill" by its detractors-that represented the last realistic 
hope of shoring up black voting rights in the South against the wave of racial disfranchisement that 
swept the region after 1890. 
190. [d. Congressman Foran likewise alerted his colleagues to this demographic trend when he 
introduced the Contract Labor Bill. "While the immigration from Germany, Ireland, England, and 
Scotland, and other countries from which the best class of immigrants come, has decreased quite 
largely during the last year," he noted, "the immigration from Italy and Hungary has largely 
increased." 15 CONGo REc. 5350 (1884). Congressman Ferrell was one of many who objected 
explicitly to a contract labor system by which "Italians, Hungarians, Poles, Canadian French, and other 
inferior races are brought into competition with American citizens." [d. at 5363. See also, for example, 
id. at 5369 (noting that the bill is "designed ... to exclude the degraded lazzaroni of Italy, the almost 
servile laborers of Hungary and other southern European countries"); id. at 5349 (referring to "the 
large numbers of degraded, ignorant, brutal Italians and Hungarian laborers" imported into the United 
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The construction of fitness for free labor as a matter of racial character 
provided critics of foreign pauper labor with an important new platform 
from which to challenge the virtues of unbridled economic competition. 
Foran, the former union president, took aim at the conventional political-
economic wisdom "that in the struggle for existence, in the 'free for all' 
contest recognized by our governmental policy, the fittest and best will 
survive, and that the American, being better qualified for this struggle than 
the Italian or Slavonian, no dangers need be apprehended."191 Those who 
cast their blind faith in the "survival of the fittest," Foran argued, 
sometimes forget that the "fitness" to which that law of nature refers "is 
not necessarily what from moral, intellectual, or esthetic considerations 
would be called the superior."l92 The crisis in foreign pauper labor thus 
complicated the Social Darwinist arguments that classical liberals had 
adopted to condemn dependency as pauperism and to defend an 
unregulated market in wage labor. 193 In the 1870s, mere survival without 
the assistance of charity testified to a minimal level of fitness. During the 
crisis of foreign pauper labor, by contrast, unassisted survival by itself 
proved nothing about the quality of the prospective citizen-worker; 
civilization was now measured by an altogether different metric. 
Through images of national invasion and infestation, commentators 
described a civilized yet highly vulnerable American citizenry. 
Congressman Cutcheon's torrent of metaphors is representative. Foreign 
pauper laborers, he declared, were 
the Goths and Vandals of the modem era. They come only to lay 
waste, to degrade, and to destroy. They bring with them ignorance, 
degraded morals, a low standard of civilization, and no motive to 
intended citizenship. Like the vast flights of grasshoppers and locusts 
that a few years since devastated our Western prairie states, they 
States like "so many cattle"); and id. at 5354 (counseling that the United States resist "welcoming to 
the ranks of our laborers men and women from the worst associations of Eastern and Southern 
Europe"). Such statements notwithstanding, the Irish also remained variably subject to unfavorable 
racial construction even decades after they presumably had been culturally "whitened." See NOEL 
IGNATIEV, How THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995). For Gilded-Age racializations of the Irish, see 
W.M.F. Round, Immigration and Crime, 8 FORUM 428, 430 (\889) ("It takes more than one 
generation to get the taint of 'effete monarchy' out of the blood"; "the shamrock is a plant of ... 
strong root .... "). See also supra text accompanying notes \05- \07 (discussing the alleged hereditary 
deficiency of English "tramps" during the 1870s crisis of dependency); infra text accompanying note 
213 (discussing the incompatibility of the German and Canadian races with the American 
Constitution). The persistence, or perhaps renewal, of Irish racial difference underscores that Gilded-
Age racialism was a response more to the crises of mass dependency than a simple reaction to the 
distinct geographic origins, customs, and languages-the perceived "foreignness"--of the most recent 
arrivals. 
191. 15 CONGo REc. 5351 (\884). 
192. Id. 
193. The most prominent example of the theme of social Darwinism in Gilded-Age classical 
liberal thought is WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT THE SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER 
(1883). 
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sweep down upon our fields of labor to devour and strip from us the 
benefit of our customs and the laws protecting American labor, and 
then take their flight again back to the breeding places from which 
they came. 194 
Such overwrought language imagines a citizenry in perpetual jeopardy of 
violation. As Republican Senator Lot Morrill remarked, the nation was 
being overrun by immigrants "more dangerous to the individuality and 
deep-seated stamina of the American people, and more worthy of rigid 
quarantine, than even the most leprous diseases." Morrill was referring 
specifically "to those whose inherent deficiencies and inequities are 
thoroughbred, and who are incapable of evolution, whether in this 
generation or the next, as is the leopard to change his spotS."195 The 
Senator's remarks illustrate the emerging construction of European 
immigrants as a foreign plague infesting the American labor market. This 
was a hereditary inheritance that, unlike the pauperism of the previous 
decade, could not be unlearned, rehabilitated, or "sweated out" of its 
carriers, and whose generational transmission could not be halted. If 
immigration were left unchecked, editorialized the charity periodical Our 
Day in 1889, the nation would be offering itself up as "the natural cess-
pool for the reception of the human offal and rubbish of the entire 
world."l96 European immigration had threatened to become, as Walker 
warned, "not a re-enforcement of our population, ... but a replacement of 
native by foreign stock."197 
2. Revisiting Universal Principles: Citizenship and Racial Difference 
Critics maintained that because racially unfit laborers degraded not only 
America's labor market and racial stock, but also the quality of its 
citizenship, unchecked immigration placed in jeopardy the very political 
foundation of the republic. In an 1891 issue of the North American 
Review, Congressman Lodge again intoned that "the immigration of 
people removed from us in race and blood is rapidly increasing," and 
urged that whatever economic benefits might accrue from such additions 
would be "dearly bought if we pay for them a price which involves the 
lowering of the standard of American citizenship."198 As Lodge's 
formulation underscores, the nation appeared to be crossing a great bridge 
between national historical epochs. It was leaving behind forever the 
194. 15 CONGo REC. 5369 (1884). 
195. Senator Morrill, quoted in Round, supra note 190, at 428. 
196. New Reasonsfor Restricting Immigration, 3 OUR DAY 127, 131 (1889). 
197. Walker, supra note 158, at 624. See also Powderly, supra note 173, at 77. 
198. Henry Cabot Lodge, Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration, 152 N. AM. REV. 602, 611 
(189\). 
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Jeffersonian and Lincolnian republic in which property ownership and 
independent labor were the wellsprings of virtuous citizenship, and 
entering into a new, distinctly modem era. The nation's traditional 
"liberality toward immigration, combined with the normal growth of the 
population in the course of the present century," wrote Lodge, "rapidly 
filled the country, and the conditions under which at the outset we had 
opened our doors and asked every one to come in changed radically."199 
Specifically, the United States "no longer [has] endless tracts of fertile 
land crying for settlement. ... [T]he conditions have changed utterly from 
the days when the supply of vacant land was indefinite, the demand for 
labor almost unbounded, and the supply of people very limited."20o The 
traditional ingredients of the exceptional republic, in other words, had 
ceased to exist. Unless aggressive action were taken, the United States 
surely would be shaken by the same social crises that afflicted Europe-
mass poverty, class conflict, radicalism, and political instability. Indeed, 
according to Lodge, that time had already arrived. "In many parts of the 
country," he wrote, "the struggle for existence in large cities has become 
as fierce as in the Old World .... This tendency is perilous both socially 
and politically."201 
The problem of foreign pauper labor thus presented an unsettling 
contradiction: On the one hand, American citizenship and political 
institutions were purportedly rooted in universally applicable 
Enlightenment principles, such as political freedom, equality, and the 
natural rights of man. As the periodical Our Day explained in 1889, 
The constitution of the United States breaths a sanguine spirit. It is 
founded upon trust in human nature. . . . When the founders of the 
American Republic stretched out their hands with a hospitable 
welcome to all the oppressed of the earth, it was in large measure 
because Rousseau had them taught to believe in the inherent 
goodness of man. They took for granted that the oppressed, no matter 
who they were and whence them come, were deserving characters, 
who needed only the liberty which the new republic offered them, to 
grow to the full stature of civic, moral, and intellectual manhood. 202 
The historically successful assimilation of European immigrants to 
republican institutions appeared to confirm that universality.203 On the 
199. 22 CONGo REC. 2957 (1891). 
200. /d. 
201. ld. 
202. New Reasons, supra note 196, at 126-27. 
203. This assertion is complicated by the uneven but persistent fact of racial discrimination 
against blacks in the postbellum South, and by the rise of Jim Crow laws concurrent to the 
racialization of European immigrants. It is worth noting, however, that the northern Republican logic 
of racial difference and citizenship with respect to southern blacks in the period between the end of the 
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other hand, Our Day editorialized, "[t]he eighteenth century knew little of 
the influence of heredity."204 The specter of unfit foreigners degrading the 
quality of the American citizenry, and thus American citizenship itself, 
now counseled against their indiscriminate inclusion within the national 
political body.205 
In the end, most critics of foreign pauper labor concluded that liberal 
constitutional principles such as political freedom and equality were not, 
after all, generally applicable, but rather were implicitly premised on each 
would-be citizen's possession of a suitable racial inheritance. A 
remarkable variety of observers considered the old presumption that all 
comers were suitable to liberal political institutions to be a dangerous 
anachronism. As Our Day put it, the nation was experiencing an influx of 
foreigners 
not dreamed of by the founders of the republic; and if it had been 
dreamed of, some effective safeguard would have been devised to 
protect their cherished institutions from the dangers to which they 
would inevitably be exposed in the hands of a semi-alien race, in 
conflict with an alien spirit.206 
Commentators routinely asserted that the capacity for self-government 
and for participation in republican political institutions was a racially 
specific intellectual trait. The theory of Anglo-Saxon constitutionalism 
expressed in the Our Day editorial was typical: 
The constitution ... was framed by men of Anglo-Saxon origin for 
their own government; and it presupposes the long political evolution 
to which that race has been subjected in the mother-land during eight 
or nine centuries. It presupposes Anglo-Saxon virtues of moderation, 
self-restraint, and sense of fair play. It is only a high civilization 
which exhibits these virtues; and to impose free institutions upon a 
people which does not possess them, is to endanger the social order 
and bring free institutions into unmerited reproach. . . . It takes 
generations of intelligent, self-restrained, and self-respecting 
Civil War and the 1890s shared more with that of European immigrants than one might at first 
imagine. See HEATHER Cox RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR AND 
POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901 (2001). 
204. /d. 
205. The political scientist John Hawks Noble acknowledged this tension explicitly. Rather than 
"making race a test of fitness"-the policy that the United States had "adopted with reference to the 
Chinese"-he advocated the imposition of a literacy test on would-be European immigrants because 
"it makes the least inroad on the doctrine that every individual is a free citizen of the world,-an 
abstract theory for whose sake we are sacrificing the great advantage of our elbow-room and risking 
our national character, with a generosity at which foreign critics have long wondered." John Hawks 
Noble, The Present State of the Immigration Question, 7 POL. SCI. Q. 232, 243 (1892). 
206. New Reasons, supra note 196, at 128. 
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ancestors to make a man fit to govern himself .... 207 
The principle of universal political freedom and equality, of which the 
United States Constitution was the most concrete expression, had been 
premised on the now-doubtful truth that all men were indeed created 
equal. As the editorial explained, "[a] republic can only be carried on by 
republicans. "208 A "republican" would no longer be defined by the fading 
antebellum virtues of personal independence, or social mobility, or simply 
participation in republican institutions. In the racialist logic of the new era, 
republicans were born, rather than made. In light of modem knowledge of 
human nature and racial difference, the applicability of the Constitution 
had to be understood not as universal, but rather as contingent on the 
racial character of those claiming access to the American polity. 209 
As the nation's lawmakers debated the crisis of foreign pauper labor, 
they, too, found cause to question whether it was appropriate to extend 
indiscriminately the nation's traditional liberality to its newest candidates 
for economic and political admission. Kansas Senator John Ingalls, a 
radical Republican and vocal defender of black suffrage, urged his 
colleagues ''to consider whether the doctrines of the natural rights of man 
as applied to this continent have not reached a dangerous extremity, [and] 
. . . whether every man, woman, and child on the face of this earth, no 
matter what may be his physical, mental, or moral condition, has the 
natural right to come to this country . . . to the detriment . . . of those 
already here.,,210 In order to reinvigorate the self-evident, universal truths 
and political principles upon which the republic was founded, Ingalls 
suggested, their significance would have to be modified. Elaborating a line 
of reasoning that would have seemed paradoxical just a decade earlier, the 
sponsors of the Contract Labor Bill argued that in order to "leave[] all 
natural laws, business laws, social laws, industrial laws to their natural 
207. Id. at 128-29. Mayo-Smith similarly cautioned that "[tlhe thing we have to fear most is the 
political danger of the infusion of so much alien blood into our social body that we shall lose the 
capacity and power of self-government." Richmond Mayo-Smith, Control of Immigration, 3 POL. SCI. 
Q. 409, 415 (1888). See also Wood, supra note 173, at 521. 
208. New Reasons, supra note 196, at 129. 
209. Perhaps no one person melded a commitment to the universalistic ethos of liberal 
republicanism with virulent racialist nativism as prominently as Reverend Josiah Strong, a founder of 
the Social Gospel Movement and a powerful critic of the mass poverty born of unrestrained industrial 
competition. Strong's 1885 book Our Country was one of the era's most influential tracks on Anglo-
Saxon Protestant supremacy and the importance of restricting entry into the United States of inferior 
European races, even as it brimmed with liberal optimism, praise for popular sovereignty, and calls for 
government action to redress economic inequality. See SMITH, supra note 20, at 353-56. 
210. 16 CONGo REC. 1624 (1885). "Although I recognize in a broad sense the brotherhood of man 
and our obligations to all men," Congressman Cutcheon declared, "the Almighty has made us 
Americans .... Our first duty is to America and to Americans; to build here a great, free, enlightened 
and fruitful civilization ... that shall hold as precious above all things the manhood of the individual 
man." 15 CONGo REC. 5370 (1884). 
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effect and operation,"211 Congress would have to intervene in the labor 
market to deny access to the unfit. The Bill would thus preserve the 
natural operation of liberal economic laws by limiting their applicability to 
those whose natures were suited to American civilization and citizenship. 
As the forgoing discussion suggests, the campaign to exclude foreign 
pauper laborers represented far more than an effort to check the entry of 
those whose passage to the United States had been assisted. Rather, it was 
a movement to filter out members of the inferior national races without 
checking the entry of the superior ones. "To the warm-hearted and 
intelligent Celt, to the industrious and economical German, to the self-
reliant Scandinavian, let the doors of the Republic be thrown wide 
open,"212 trumpeted Missouri Senator George Vest. The new legislative 
challenge, explained a critic in the popular Chautauquan, was to 
encourage the immigration of those nationalities who had long furnished 
the United States with "noble patriots," while restricting the entry of those 
from the "south and eastern part of Europe which have not held their own 
in the race struggle," and who were "least capable of understanding our 
institutions, or adapted to responding to the opportunities and privileges of 
a free government."213 The prohibition against pauper labor would defuse 
the national crises of dependency by excluding those whose racial 
endowments presumably disabled them from harmonizing liberal 
economic freedom and virtuous republican citizenship. 
3. Unassimilability 
Throughout the nation's history, the speedy cultural and political 
assimilation of new additions to the citizenry had been a cardinal premise 
of the regime of free immigration. During the debates over the Contract 
Labor Bill, Congressman Maybury reflected on the importance of 
assimilation to the health of the republic: 
In the century of our existence as a nation no feature of her history is 
more plainly marked than that which records the ready assimilation 
211. 16 CONGo REC. 1624 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair). 
212. 16 CONGo REC. 2780 (1885). 
213. Canby, supra note 158, at 199. See also Arthur Cassot, Should We Restrict Immigration?, 3 
AM. 1. POL. 244, 249-50 (1893). Yet even the very same nationalities that that were frequently 
celebrated as the ideal raw material for economic and political independence sometimes came under 
attack. Addressing the "influx of elements ... alien to the old New England character," Mayo-Smith 
declared, "[ilt is scarcely possible to conceive of the Fathers adopting the mass of Catholic Irish and 
French Canadians and beer-drinking Germans who make up the foreign-born." Mayo-Smith, supra 
note 159, at 57. The Irish were frequently the object of particular opprobrium. See A. Cleveland Coxe, 
Government by Aliens, 7 FORUM 597, 600-01 (1889). Such statements suggest that the surge of 
racialist nativism between the mid-1880s and early 1890s was less a response to the perceived 
heightened "foreignness" of new immigrants' language and culture than a means of adapting liberal 
republican values to the exigencies of the new era. 
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on the part of the masses of honest emigrants with those of this land 
and to the manner born. Had not the friendship for the institutions of 
this land, respect for her laws, and loyalty to her interests marked the 
emigrating millions, how unstable the framework of popular 
government would be.214 
In the context of the crisis of foreign pauper labor, however, immigrants' 
desire, and even capacity, to assimilate fell into doubt. 
Popular political and social scientific periodicals between the mid-1880s 
and early 1890s are filled with admonishments to readers that, without the 
requisite economic conditions and racial material, the promise of 
citizenship was by itself of little value as a force of assimilation. One 
author presented the problem to the readers of The Chautauquan with an 
especially illustrative image: "The popular orator is the one who pictures 
our governmental domain as a huge hopper into which the grist of any and 
every nation may be poured, to come out liberty-loving, law-abiding 
Americans, through some mysterious CIVIC alchemy of whose 
transforming powers we are superstitiously credulous." But the 
appearance of "foreign colonies in our large cities," the article continued, 
whose inhabitants were "making no effort to become American warns that 
the hopper is either choked from overfilling or that it is not doing its 
proper work.,,215 At the heart of this pessimism lay a deep concern that the 
industrial transformation of labor-the historic displacement of the 
independent, agrarian producer by the industrial hireling-had rendered 
anachronistic the republican ideal of virtuous, independent citizenship. 
The belief that "the earth is the great disinfectant," cautioned Mayo-Smith, 
"and that all we need to do is get these depraved dregs of European 
civilization on to the land in order to reform them,-it is in early 
civilization that this saying is true.,,216 "As long as there was no danger of 
the labor market becoming overstocked," agreed Roosevelt in 1888, "we 
were able with safety to trust to our extraordinary powers of assimilation 
to turn immigrants or their children sooner or later into American citizens, 
with the same feelings, prejudices and habits of thought as the rest of 
US.,,217 "The growth of a proletariat," however, "would surely in the end 
214. 15 CONGo REC. 5353 (1884). 
215. Canby, supra note 158, at 199. 
216. Mayo-Smith, supra note 207, at 413. Elsewhere, Mayo-Smith cautioned against any 
"pleasant optimism about this conception that the child born on this soil and breathing this air becomes 
a full-born American .... But there is still the foreign blood," he warned, "and in a good many cases 
the foreign language and customs." Mayo-Smith, supra note 159, at 54. 
217. Roosevelt, supra note 15 I, at 85-86. See also Mayo-Smith, supra note 159, at 53. In the first 
part of the century, Mayo-Smith argued, "the foreign increment ... could be readily and rapidly 
assimilated; it did not add itself to an unassimilated mass already present. ... There came, in those 
early days, no great mass of unskilled labor, crowding the unskilled occupations .... Even in the 
period from 1865 to 1873 the very activity of speculation and railroad enterprise made an opening for 
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bring the overthrow of the whole system."218 As critics of foreign pauper 
labor meditated on the problem, their former confidence that immigrants 
would be economically, culturally, and politically "Americanized" largely 
vanished.219 
The debate over the efficacy of America's assimilationist "hopper" 
mapped directly onto the division of opinion over whether the 
exceptionalist ideal of a classless society of free, independent laborers 
remained viable. To a significant extent, opinion divided along regional 
lines. Speaking for the North (and to a lesser extent, the Midwest), 
Pennsylvania Republican William Kelley cautioned that opponents of the 
Contract Labor Bill could no longer indulge the conceit that the United 
States was immune from the devastating economic conditions that 
afflicted European laborers. "I have looked upon the misery of the British, 
French, Belgian, German, and Austrian laborers," he announced, and "I 
painfully admit that specimens of [such ills] all can be found in this 
country .... They are merely seminal here; ... but you will find them 
blooming everywhere you find population all condensed."220 On behalf of 
the South and West, Texas Senator Richard Coke retorted that the Bill's 
proponents appeared concerned only with the "Northern and Eastern 
States, which are said to be overstocked with labor," while ignoring the 
"great scarcity of labor" in the rest of the country. "We in the South and 
West want labor; we need men, women, and children to labor in our fields 
... to grow up and constitute a part of the landholding citizenship of the 
country ... :>221 In controversion of the myopic pessimism voiced by 
critics in the industrial sections of the country, a vocal southern 
congressional contingent argued that if modem conditions of wage labor 
were a source of degradation and dependency in the North and East, the 
remedy was not to check immigration, but rather to channel foreign 
laborers to those regions where they were needed. The United States had 
not yet reached the end of its exceptional history, southerners argued; the 
the new-comers." Id. at 53. "We are no longer in that vigorous early civilization when we could digest 
almost anything sent to us and when the very conditions of life here corrected and controlled the 
weaknesses of the immigrants." Id. at 68. 
218. Roosevelt, supra note 151, at 88. 
219. Contemporaries' faith in the assimilative power of the United States hinged on their 
confidence in the nation's ability to preserve, or restore, free and independent labor as the economic 
paradigm. Even dissenters from the prevailing anti-immigrant sentiment confirmed the close relation 
between the health of the free labor system, and the fitness of the immigrants who participated in it. 
The political economist Edward Atkinson, for example, pinned his continuing confidence in 
assimilation on the availability of land and the decentralization of industrial production. "Great forces 
are now in action," he assured the readers of The Forum, "tending to break up the concentration of the 
factory system, which will also very surely break up the congestion in cities by diffusing the working 
population throughout the suburbs and over wider and wider areas." Edward Atkinson, Incalculable 
Roomfor Immigrants, 13 FORUM 360, 370 (1893). 
220. 15 CONGo REC. 5354 (1884). 
221. 16 CONGo REC. 1788 (1885). 
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means for achieving economic independence and republican citizenship 
remained available for all who would grasp them. "An immigrant can not 
land upon [Texas] soil and breath that atmosphere without feeling that he 
is a free man," Coke continued. "The servile labor Senators speak of in the 
North and East does not and can not exist there. Homesteads are too easily 
acquired for that. . . . The man with labor in his muscles is more 
independent than in any other country under the sun.,,222 
Yet to advocates of stronger control over immigration, it was becoming 
clear that the universalist economic and political principles according to 
which European immigration had been governed---or, more precisely, left 
ungoverned-in the past had actually always rested on an increasingly 
visible substructure of historical contingencies. "As long as Uncle Sam 
has a farm for every man," Roosevelt explained, "just so long he will 
gladly welcome every honest immigrant, whatever his creed or his 
language; but the minute the supply of farms threatens to give out, then to 
admit shoals of hungry expectants would be of no benefit to them, and 
would be a great detriment to the people already in the land.,,223 Only if 
Congress were to impose a "gradual check" on immigration, "so as to 
keep out the least desirable kinds of immigrants, and to lessen the bulk of 
the immigration," would the nation be justified in trusting its "assimilative 
powers, firm in the belief that in a generation or so the new comers will be 
changed into Americans, with enough morality and intellect to ... become 
small capitalists on their own account.,,224 To retain the nation's long-
standing practice of liberally admitting European immigrants at a time 
when most wage laborers would never become "small capitalists" would 
destroy the quality of American citizenship. Yet in spite of their 
apparently keen awareness that the source of the newly conspicuous 
contingencies was the industrial reorganization of labor, critics like Smith 
and, to a lesser extent, Roosevelt indicted not the wage system itself, but 
the allegedly degraded character of those who inhabited its lowest levels. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, critics of foreign pauper labor 
described a national landscape in which a racialized foreign menace posed 
a threat of invasion-at once economic, cultural, political, and racial-to 
an entity called the "American citizenry." I have thus far treated that 
concept as though it bore a self-evident meaning that pre-existed the 
debate over foreign labor. That was not the case. The story of how Gilded-
Age political and intellectual elites made sense of the crises of American 
dependency is also the story of how a distinctively modem conception of 
the American citizenry came into being. It is to this new understanding 
222. Id. 
223. Roosevelt, supra note 151, at 89. 
224. Id. at 88. 
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that I now tum. 
D. Federal Policing of the New American Citizenry 
In a different ideological context, policymakers and others might have 
recognized in the Gilded-Age crises of dependency the consequences of 
the industrial reorganization of the economy, including mass urbanization 
and the deskilling of labor. Such an interpretation could have suggested 
remedies such as accommodating organized workers' demands for a 
legislatively mandated living wage and shortened workday, or 
strengthening the bargaining position of unions to countervail the 
economic power of large employers. That is, critics of dependency could 
have advocated regulatory interventions that focused on the structure of, 
or balance of power within, the labor market. 225 Yet with the notable 
exception of labor spokesmen, they generally eschewed such options, and 
instead located the peril of "pauperizing" labor in the racial differences 
borne by a distinctly foreign agent-the dependent laborers themselves. 
This discourse of national self-defense against an external menace 
counseled not reform of the rules governing participation in the labor 
market, but rather the restriction of access to that market through the 
exclusion of the unfit. 
Through their construction of this new menace, Americans were 
engaged in a subtle, and probably little-noticed, transformation of how 
they understood and talked about their political body. For most of the 
nation's history, its exceptionalist identity had resided in the extraordinary 
economic and political equality enjoyed by its white, male, propertied 
citizens, presumably secured for all time by its vast, open frontier and 
robust constitutional democracy. The American polity, under this view, 
was subject to a process of perpetual regeneration; its progressive nature 
ensured by the republic's unique economic resources and political 
machinery. As the cnSlS of foreign pauper labor threatened 
contemporaries' exceptionalist faith-as they began to doubt the self-
sustaining quality of the American economic and political system-they 
reconceived the nature of the citizenry itself. As the contours of their 
reconstructed vision took shape, the American polity looked less like the 
assimilationist "hopper" of old than a kind of vast national reservoir of 
human material, consisting of the aggregate heredity of all those whose 
natural endowments had been permitted to flow in. 
This transformation amounted to nothing less than the birth of a new, 
distinctively modem understanding of the American polity. The relative 
quality of the citizenry would no longer depend predominantly on new 
225. See supra note 9. 
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arrivals' exposure to the uplifting influences of free labor and republican 
political institutions. Rather, it would be defined explicitly in opposition to 
that which threatened to degrade it-the uncivilized, racially inferior, 
citizenship-decaying material of unfit immigrant laborers-and its quality 
preserved only by excluding such material. Significantly, the expositors of 
the new American citizenry made routine use of corporeal metaphors. 
Unless immigration was checked, warned Roosevelt in 1888, "the whole 
national body [will] deteriorate."226 Ohio Republican Benjamin 
Butterworth similarly admonished his colleagues that unchecked 
immigration constituted "a kind of moral disease which is vastly more 
injurious to the country than to have it flooded with small pocks."221 Such 
images represent more than rhetorical color. They signal an emergent 
conception of the citizenry as a kind of unified entity or organism 
composed of constituent elements whose condition could, through proper 
monitoring, be definitively known and, if need be, excluded. As Shaler put 
it in The Atlantic Monthly, eligibility for national inclusion should tum on 
the "extent to which the foreign people we receive are already fit ... for 
incorporation into the body of American citizens."228 
By conscientiously filtering the material that would nourish the national 
body, the government could go a long way toward insuring the nation's 
good health. This vision formed the conceptual groundwork of the 
functional equivalent of a new federal police power. Because judgments 
about immigrants' fitness would shape the national character, the 
responsibility could not properly rest with individual states. The duty of 
self-preservation, the role of, as Lodge put it, "sift[ing] the chaff from the 
wheat,"229 fell squarely on the federal government. Immigration regulation 
had become a variety of public health policing, but on a necessarily 
national scale. At issue was no longer merely weeding out the insane, 
diseased, or dependent-the kind of public health, morals, or welfare 
regulation traditionally addressed through the police powers of individual 
226. Roosevelt, supra note 151, at 88. 
227. 22 CONGo REC. 3177 (1891). 
228. Shaler, supra note 185, at 648. Both sides of the immigration debate anthropomorphized the 
national body in remarkably similar terms. Speaking against the Contract Labor Bill, Senator Thomas 
Bayard, a Delaware Democrat and future Secretary of State assured his colleagues that because "[s]elf 
preservation" was "the first instinct of nature, the instinct of society as organized and of the 
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without the proposed legislation. 16 CONGo REC. 1625 (1885). Even this opponent of enhanced 
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89. 
229. 22 CONGo REC. 2956 (1891). 
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states. The world described by the Supreme Court in New York v. Miln230 
half a century earlier-where state officials policed foreign paupers under 
the very same authority they used to police home-grown criminals-had 
become virtually unrecognizable. The meaning of pauperism--economic, 
political, and racial-had now overflowed the bounds of locality and 
hence transcended the jurisdictions of individual states. In the post-1884 
era of foreign pauper labor, not only the defense of the nation against 
racially degraded workers was at stake, but also the fitness of the 
American citizenry, the quality of citizenship itself, and, ultimately, the 
very health of the republic. As Noble put it, "self-preservation requires the 
United States to restrain the foreign tide that is flooding in."23\ "Anybody 
who isn't fit to become a citizen ... isn't fit to come here at all," intoned 
another author in The Social Economist. "We don't want him, and he 
should be debarred because he is bad. Draw the lines of entrance tight and 
taut .... "232 
The "bad" could only be debarred through a rigorously administered 
governmental intervention into a process that in earlier times had been left 
to the "natural" laws of human behavior and economic competition, and 
tempered only by the gentle hand of the New York Commissioners. In an 
era when pauper laborers imported under slave-like conditions threatened 
to degrade American civilization, Mayo-Smith explained, the federal 
government was "obliged to interfere in the process of natural selection in 
order to make sure that only the fittest survive."233 
While proposals to reform federal immigration law were numerous and 
varied, all shared the unambiguous purpose of preserving the racial 
integrity of the national body. One of the most popular would have 
required would-be immigrants to obtain a "certificate of character" from 
an American consul before they would be permitted to board a ship bound 
for the United States.234 The Nation advocated a similar system of 
inspection, under which the American consul in each immigrant's country 
of origin would issue a certificate of fitness for immigration to the United 
States "only when [he] is reasonably sure that the applicant is capable of 
self-support and intends to support himself and his family."235 Lodge 
championed a requirement that immigrants pass a literacy test, either in 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67. 
231. Noble, supra note 205, at 238. 
232. Samuel Epes Turner, The Immigration Problem, 2 Soc. ECONOMIST 358,365 (1892). 
233. Mayo-Smith, supra note 207, at 416. 
234. 22 CONGo REC. 2946 (1891) (statement of Rep. William Oates). 
235. Immigration Again, supra note 139, at 108. Others approved of the principle of "sifting" 
immigrants before they left Europe, but argued that the steamship companies were better suited than 
the consuls to "secure the regulation of the immigration and its inspection at its fountain head." Gustav 
H. Schwab. A Practical Remedyfor the Evils of Immigration, 14 FORUM 805, 812 (1893). 
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English or in their native language, as the only way to achieve an 
"intelligent restriction or sifting of the total mass of immigration." Such a 
test, he explained, "would sift the immigrants who come to this country, 
and would shut out in a very large measure those elements which tend to 
lower the quality of the citizenship."236 Francis Amasa Walker advocated 
requiring a sizeable "deposit" from each immigrant, both as an indemnity 
against the cost of his future support and as proof of his economic fitness. 
As one author explained, such a measure would "reclaim our country from 
the unenviable distinction of being the 'dumping ground' for the earth's 
refuse. It would not meanwhile debar thrifty Anglo-Saxons, Teutons, or 
Celts.,,237 Finally, a vocal minority urged making "race" the explicit test of 
eligibility, essentially presaging by three decades the thrust of the 1924 
Act.238 Although the presumed congressional authority to enact each of 
these proposals lay in the Commerce Clause, such pervasive attention to 
the nation's intermeshed racial, economic, and political health suggests 
that advocates viewed each such reform as something closer in purpose to 
a federal police measure. 
Despite spirited lobbying by those inside of Congress and out, the 
Immigration Act of 1891 adopted none of these proposals. The Act 
ultimately reaffirmed the key elements of the 1882 Act and the Contract 
Labor Act of 1885, with three significant additions. First, it reincorporated 
and broadened the police purposes of the earlier laws, adding to the 
excludable classes "persons likely to become a public charge, persons 
suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease," 
"polygamists," and "any person whose ticket or passage is paid for with 
the money of another or who is assisted by others to come."239 Second, it 
prohibited steamship companies and American employers from 
"encouraging" immigration through printed advertisements, solicitation by 
agents, or otherwise.240 Most importantly, however, the 1891 Act 
236. 22 CONGo REC. 2958 (1891). See also John B. Weber & Charles Steward Smith, Our 
National Dumping Ground: A Study of Immigration, 154 N. AM. REv. 424, 438 (1892) (advocating a 
"reading and writing qualification" to "improve the[] quality" of "the enormous human stream"). "The 
test of illiteracy," wrote Noble, is "politically a fair test of intelligence, and socially a fair test of the 
standard of living .... It has been estimated that the actual effect of the test ... would be to exclude 
seventy-five percent of the Poles, Italians and Hungarians, three percent of the Irish, two percent of the 
English and one-tenth of one percent of the Germans .... " Noble, supra note 205, at 242. 
237. Canby, supra note 158, at 200. See also Philosophy of Immigration and Annexation, supra' 
note 167, at 199 (To require proof of substantial cash savings as a condition of landing would "furnish 
an economic process of natural selection."). 
238. See, e.g., Noble, supra note 205, at 242 ("A race test restriction drawn so as to correct the 
ethnic changes in the new immigration would have a good effect."). On the racial dimension of the 
Immigration Act of 1924, see Ngai, supra note 18. 
239. Act of 1891, supra note 5, § 1. Section 11 of the Act provided that "any alien who becomes a 
public charge within one year after his arrival in the United States from causes existing prior to his 
landing therein shall be deemed to have come in violation of law and shall be returned." Id. § II. 
240. Id. §§ 3, 4. Section 3 made it a violation of the Act to "assist or encourage the importation or 
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transferred the sole authority to administer immigration regulations-
including the inspection of newly landed immigrants, the decision to 
return undesirables, the promulgation of administrative rules, the 
adjudication of alleged violations, and the assignment of penalties-to the 
federal government, creating the office of the Superintendent of 
Immigration under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury.241 The 
federalization of immigration regulation was complete. 
As I have argued, that process was shaped by the desire of Gilded-Age 
legislators and other critics of dependency to preserve the vaunted ideal of 
a republic of free, economically independent, politically virtuous citizens, 
in the face of an industrial transformation that rendered the material and 
ideological underpinnings of that ideal anachronistic. The federal 
assumption of control over immigration was grounded in a vision of the 
American citizenry in which its constituent members' racial endowments, 
rather than their relationship to property or labor, would sustain the 
exceptionalism of the republic. 
CONCLUSION 
Postbellum political economy was rooted in ostensibly universal 
Enlightenment values-the voluntariness of individual consent, the 
entitlement of citizens to political freedom and equality, and the natural 
rights of man. In theory, such principles were diametrically opposed to the 
ascriptive inegalitarianism that underlay the Gilded-Age federalization of 
immigration law. For this reason, it is logical to conclude, as some 
scholars have,242 that racialist nativism triumphed politically and legally in 
spite of the nation's universalist commitments. The analysis presented 
here supports a very different conclusion: that contemporaries seized on 
the discourse of racialist nativism when they did precisely because it 
enabled them to reconcile their liberal republican values with an industrial 
labor system that seemed to place the continuing coherence of that 
worldview into jeopardy. Far from providing an antidote, or 
counterweight, to the surge of racialism, Americans' liberal republican 
commitments literally led them to, and were vindicated by, their embrace 
of racialism. 
This Article further shows how economic and racial meanings were 
migration of any alien by promise of employment through advertisements printed and published in any 
foreign country, and any alien coming to this country in consequence of such an advertisement shall 
be treated as coming under a contract." /d. §3. Section 4 provided that "no steamship or transportation 
company or owners of vessels shall directly, or through agents, either by writing, printing, or oral 
representations, solicit, invite, or encourage the immigration of any alien into the United States." [d. 
§4. 
241. /d. §7. 
242. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
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mutually instantiated. I have sought to move beyond the contention that 
immigrants were made "scapegoats" for the nation's deeper economic 
problems, or that their alleged economic pathologies were "racialized"-
both accurate, though somewhat unremarkable, conclusions. Instead, my 
analysis illuminates how the fact of that racialization, as well its particular 
content, are unintelligible apart from the ideological exigencies of the 
moment. The Article thus provides insight into both the stubborn 
durability and extreme protean quality of ideas about racial difference. 
Only once we understand the discursive interdependence of economic and 
racial categories can we begin to grasp how and why the meaning of 
"race" changed so dramatically in just two decades-how it was that in 
1870 European immigrants could represent the vigorous raw material of a 
prosperous republic; in 1880 the degraded, yet potentially redeemable, 
carriers of hereditary economic dependency; and in 1890 the uncivilized 
and racially degenerate assailants of the American nation. In each of the 
two latter cases, contemporaries rationalized an unexceptional picture of 
the industrial United States by attributing the perceived pathology of the 
moment to the degraded, yet variable, racial natures of European 
immigrants. 
Through this series of interpretive and diagnostic choices, northern 
policymakers, political intellectuals, social reformers, political 
economists, judges, labor leaders and others transformed both the 
prevailing purpose of immigration regulation-from policing the 
environment into which immigrants landed, to policing the fitness of the 
immigrants themselves-and its institutional locus-from the states to the 
federal government. In the process, they supplanted Americans' traditional 
faith in the social and political virtues associated with independent 
producerhood with a new emphasis on hereditary fitness, and helped to 
usher in a genuinely novel and distinctly modem American 
exceptionalism for the industrial era. 
